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This paper derives analytical expressions for the revenue elasticity of the Spanish 
personal income tax system, as applied to tax units and in aggregate. This is 
complicated by the schedular nature of the system, and the role of central and 
regional governments, along with the existence of a range of tax credits and eligible 
expenditures and deductions. Empirical estimates are obtained using a cross-sectional 
dataset which enables a number of important ancillary elasticities (relating to 
allowances and tax credits, and different income sources) to be estimated. It was 
found that there is considerable variation among tax units in the revenue elasticity, 
with highly (positively) skewed distributions. The nature of the distributions varies 
among regions of Spain, and the aggregate elasticities for each region were found to 
display some variation associated with income distribution differences. The national 
aggregate is found to be around 1.3. The paper also derives aggregate tax revenue as 
a function of characteristics of the distribution of taxable income in each region. This 
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1  Introduction 
An important characteristic of any personal income tax structure is the elasticity of 
income tax revenue with respect to changes in gross income, when there are no 
adjustments to income thresholds or other discretionary changes to the tax structure. 
The revenue elasticity provides, at individual and aggregate levels, a measure of 
‘fiscal drag’ arising from the failure to adjust income tax thresholds when incomes 
increase. Fiscal drag, or ‘built-in flexibility’, has implications for both the revenue 
and redistributive effects of taxation over the business cycle.
2 This measure is also 
useful when considering the ‘automatic stabilisation’ properties of the tax system.
3 
For tax planning purposes it is also important to be able to estimate the implications 
for total income tax revenue of a range of exogenous changes. 
 
The aim of this paper is to estimate the revenue elasticity properties of the Spanish 
personal income tax structure and to provide a method of examining the implications 
for total tax revenue of a number of changes, including changes in the distribution of 
income and in the tax structure itself. Although the focus of attention is the Spanish 
structure, the methods used are more widely applicable.   
 
The Spanish tax system differs from that of many other countries and has undergone 
significant reforms, in additional to the type of base-broadening and rate-reducing 
changes which have been common in many other countries.
4 In particular, income 
taxation (since 2002) is shared between Central and Regional Governments, 
consisting of 15 autonomous regions within the Common Territory. In addition, 
different tax rates and thresholds, and other rules influencing the difference between 
                                                 
2 The revenue elasticity is closely linked to one of the measures of progressivity proposed by 
Musgrave and Thin (1948), and the link with progressivity is examined further in Podder (1997). On a 
possible relationship between the elasticity and government expenditure, see Craig and Heins (1980) 
and Misiolek and Elder (1988). 
3 On automatic stabilisation aspects of revenue elasticity, see Pohjola (1985), van den Noord (2000) 
and Mabbett (2004). A reduced importance was predicted to follow the ‘death of inflation’, by 
Heinemann (2001). 
4 On the recent reforms, see OECD (2006). 3 
 
gross and taxable income, apply to a range of income sources: this involves the use of 
a multi-schedular tax structure. There are numerous deductions, allowances and tax 
credits (at central and regional levels) which apply at various stages. A number of 
these elements depend on non-income as well as income characteristics of tax units. 




The approach followed here is to derive an analytical expression for the revenue 
elasticity of tax units. This is shown to depend on a number of ‘ancillary elasticities’ 
which affect the way in which eligible expenditures and deductions, and tax credits, 
vary with unit income, along with the relative movements of each income source. A 
large cross-sectional sample of Spanish tax units is then used to estimate values of 
the ancillary elasticities, allowing for a substantial degree of heterogeneity whereby 
the elasticities differ according to total tax unit income, the demographic composition 
of the unit, the location (automonous region) and the income source. The aggregate 
revenue elasticity for each region and for the country as a whole is then obtained as a 
tax-share weighted sum of tax unit revenue elasticities, where the weights depend on 
the way in which each tax unit’s income changes when total income changes.  
 
Having examined revenue elasticities, this paper then turns to the derivation of an 
expression for aggregate tax revenue, depending on proportions of people (within 
each region) and proportions of total income between the income thresholds of the 
income tax function. In carrying out the aggregation process in a tractable manner, it 
is necessary to begin from a given distribution of taxable income. This contrasts with 
the approach used to calculating revenue elasticities, where the latter are related to 
changes in gross incomes. The approach allows the sources of differences in tax 
revenue among regions to be identified.  
 
                                                 
5 Alternative methods include times series regressions and simulation. An early study of the US is 
Greytak and Thursby (1979). Important contributions were made in a series of papers by Hutton 
(1980) and Hutton and Lambert (1980, 1982a, 1982b, 1983, 1989). See also Caminada and 
Goudswaard (1996). For a survey of analytical properties, see Creedy and Gemmell (2002, 2006).  4 
 
Section 2 provides a description of the Spanish personal income tax system and 
formulates analytical expressions for the tax liability of each tax unit. Revenue 
elasticities relating to each tax unit are derived in Section 3, which also provides 
some numerical illustrations of their variation with tax unit income. Section 4 turns to 
the empirical estimation of revenue elasticities. First it obtains the distribution over 
tax units, using the ancillary elasticity estimates. Second, aggregate revenue 
elasticities for each region are reported. Section 4 also considers the potential 
implications of alternative income dynamic processes which allow ‘regression’ away 
from or towards the geometric mean income. Aggregate tax revenue is then examined 
in more detail in Section 5. Brief conclusions are given in Section 6.  
 
2  The Tax Structure 
This section describes the main elements of the personal income tax structure in 
Spain. The accounting period is the tax year, which corresponds to the calendar year.  
Subsection 2.1 provides a basic description of the structure as it applies to an 
individual tax unit, where the unit may consist of single individuals or married 
couples who decide to file jointly. In view of the operation of tax credits, several 
special cases need to be distinguished, as discussed in subsection 2.2. 
2.1  Income Taxation of a Tax Unit 
Let  hi y  denote the gross income of tax unit h from source  1,..., iI  . In transforming 
from gross to taxable income, there are tax-deductible expenditures and non-income 
allowances. Let  hi E  denote the tax-deductible expenditure for unit h  relating to 
source i. In general these expenditures are expected to be a function of gross income: 
this is examined in more detail below. Non-income allowances for tax unit h relating 
to source i are denoted  hi A . Taxable income,  hi x  is given by: 
    max 0, hi hi hi hi x yEA    (1) 
If the sum of actual tax-deductible expenditures and non-income allowances exceeds 
gross income for any income source, the unit effectively has ‘losses’ associated with 5 
 
that source.
6 A distinction can therefore be drawn between actual expenditures and 
those which are claimed in a year: in the following discussion,  hi E  refers to actual 
expenditures. A complication is that any ‘losses’ can be carried forward for a period 
of four years, to be deducted against future income for the same source. However, no 
allowance is made for this dynamic element on the grounds that the losses form a 
very small component of income, as shown in Appendix A.  
 
The income tax structure has marginal tax rates  ki t  and thresholds  ki a  for  1,..., kK  , 
where  ki t  applies between  ki a  and  1, ki a   (with  1, Ki a   ).
7 In addition, as mentioned 
above, separate rates are imposed at the central and regional government levels, 
although the income thresholds are common. Letting superscripts C and R refer to 
central and regional rates respectively: 
 
CR
ki ki ki ttt    (2) 
For a multi-step tax structure with K steps,    0 Tx  for  01 0 ax a , 
   11 Tx tx a   for  12 ax a , and        12 1 2 2 Tx ta a t x a     for  23 ax a , 
and so on. Then in general, if  1 kk ax a    , Creedy and Gemmell (2006, p. 25) show 
that: 
      ' kk Tx t x a  (3) 
where: 











   (4) 
Hence in the present context, if  1, ki hi k i axa    , unit h is in the kth tax bracket for 
source  i and the following expressions describe income taxation at central and 
regional levels. 
     1, '
CC C
ih i k ih ik i k i h h i k i h Ty a x a txa      (5) 
     1, '
RR R
ih i k ih ik i k i h h i k i h Ty a x a txa      (6) 
                                                 
6 This creates a tax asymmetry similar to that associated with corporation taxation, where its role is 
much more significant. 
7 From 2007, there is an exception in that Madrid has a slightly different tax structure from that of the 
other regions. This minor difference is neglected here.  6 
 
The terms  '
C
ki a  and  '
R
ki a  are the corresponding thresholds such that tax liability in a 
multi-threshold tax structure can be expressed in terms of an equivalent single-rate 
structure. In writing the expressions (5) and (6) the marginal tax rate terms, t, along 
with the effective thresholds,  ' a , need the h subscripts, in order to clarify the point 
that the tax rates and thresholds indicated are those that apply to the tax unit in 
question, depending on the tax bracket into which the unit falls.  
 
In addition, there are central and regional government non-refundable tax credits of 
C C  and  R C . Total tax paid by unit h is expressed as: 
 
11
() m a x 0 , ( ) m a x 0 , ( )
II
CR
hi i hi C i hi R
ii i
Ty T yC T yC

 
   
     (7) 
In addition, there are refundable tax credits, unrelated to income. However, it is 
argued that such refundable credits, since they can in principle be administered by a 
separate authority and their cost is unrelated to the income tax structure, should not 
be included where – as here – emphasis is on the revenue elasticity from the point of 
view of revenue growth and fiscal drag. This issue is discussed further in Appendix 
B. 
 
The existence of non-refundable tax credits means that several cases must be 
distinguished. These are discussed in the following subsection.  
2.2  Special Cases 

















  . The expression given in (7) above for tax liability is thus 
simplified to: 
   
1
( ) () ()
I
CR
hi i hi i hi R C
ii
Ty T yT y C C

     (8) 
and: 
   
1
() ( ' ' )
I
CC RR
hi kih hi kih kih kih kih R C
ii
T y tx ta ta C C

      (9) 
Furthermore, where  0 hi x   this becomes: 7 
 
    
1
() ( ' ' )
I
CC RR
hi kih hi hi hi kih kih kih kih R C
ii
T y t y E A ta ta C C

        (10) 
A further simplification is available in view of the fact that the central and regional 
income thresholds are the same. Using the above expression for  'k a , it can be shown 
that:  





kih kih kih kih ji ji j i
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    (11) 






















hi i hi C
ii
Ty T y C

   (12) 
and if  0 hi x   this becomes: 
   
1
() ( ' )
I
CC C
hi kih hi hi hi kih kih C
ii
Ty t y E A t a C

      (13) 
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ta a t t 

















  , 
the above expressions apply with C replaced by R.  
3  Individual Revenue Elasticities 
This section considers the tax revenue elasticity, measuring the extent to which tax 
revenue increases when gross income increases, at the level of the tax unit. 
Consider the effect on tax paid by a tax unit of a small increase in gross income, 
arising from changes in each of the sources, which does not take the unit into a higher 
tax bracket.
8 First, define  ( ) hi h
i
TyT    as the total tax paid by the unit. 
Furthermore, define  hh i
i
y y   as total gross income from all sources. 
 
The change in tax paid by the unit when total gross income changes is given by: 
                                                 
8 It is common not to allow for such transitions when using analytical expressions. However, when 
using a simulation approach which actually computes discrete income and tax changes, considerable 
care is needed because very large individual values, for a very small number of units, can distort the 






i hh i h
dT T y
dy y y 
 






hh h ih hh i
i hh hh i h ih
yd T y T y y
Td y T y y y 
  
        (15) 
In general denote the elasticity of A with respect to B using the notation  , AB  . Thus: 
  ,, ,
1
hh hh i h ih
I




  (16) 
The elasticity of total tax paid by unit h therefore depends on the way in which the 
individual components of income change when the unit’s total gross income changes, 
determined by  , hi h yy  .   
 
Consider the component elasticity  , hh i Ty  . Here it is not possible to obtain a 
component elasticity defined in terms of the revenue from a single source, because 
the non-refundable tax credits are related to total income tax rather than its 
components. If it were possible to distinguish revenue from each source, as for 
example  hi T , the elasticity  , hh Ty   could be expressed as a tax-share ( / hi h TT ) weighted 
sum of the product of individual elasticities  , hi hi Ty   and  , hi h yy  . 
 
For those with positive taxable incomes in excess of the tax credits, and supposing 










      
 (17) 
This can be rewritten: 
  , 1
hh q
hq kqh hq hq hq h
Ty
h hq h hq hq
y ty E A T
Ty T y y

  
       
 (18) 
 
The ratio  / hh q Ty  is the total tax paid by unit h as a proportion of h’s income from 
source q, which may be denoted by  'hq ATR : the prime is added here as it is not the 
averate rate associated with source q. It can thus be interpreted as a kind of average 9 
 
tax rate: if there were no distinction between income sources, it would be a standard 
average tax rate. The term  / hh q Ty   is the marginal tax rate,  hq MTR , relating to a 
change in income source q. The tax revenue elasticity for unit h with respect to a 
change in income source q is thus the ratio,  /' hq hq MTR ATR , as in the standard result. 
Then it can be seen that: 
  ,, , hh q h qh q h qh q
kqh hq kqh hq kqh hq






   
 
 (19) 
The term  / kqh hq h tE T  represents the tax ‘saved’ at the margin from the existence of the 
deduction,  hq E , expressed as a ratio of total tax paid. Denote this by  , Eh q  . A similar 
term,  , Ah q  , can be defined relating to allowances. Furthermore, let  kqh hqh tM I T R  , 
where the subscript h is included as a reminder that the appropriate marginal rate 
depends on the specific situation facing the tax unit. The notation, including ‘I’, 
indicates that it is the marginal income tax rate, not the effective marginal tax rate, 
/ hh q Ty  . The elasticity can therefore be written: 
  ,, , , , '
hh q h qh q h qh q
hq




      (20) 
In the special case where  hq E  and  hq A  are fixed, so that  ,, 0 Eh q Ah q     , then of 
course  hq hq kq MITR MTR t  .
9 
 
A further complication arises where the tax credits,  C C  and  R C , are not fixed, but 
depend on household characteristics. These credits are not connected with individual 
income sources, unlike the expenditures and allowances. Suppose instead that the tax 
credits depend on total income,  h y . The above elasticity is then further reduced by 













               
 (21) 
 
                                                 
9 The treatment of the relationship between allowances and income from each source is slightly 
simplified here and in the following subsection. However, as explained in Section 4, the full details are 
modelled when obtaining empirical values. 10 
 
Using the above property that  ,, ,
1
hh hh i h ih
I




 , defining  / hh h ATR T y   as the 
overall average tax rate facing the unit, and noting that 
1
,, hi h h hi yy y y 
   and, for 
example,  ,, , ab bc ac    ,it can be shown that, for those taxpayers with 
C
Ch CT   and 
R
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If there were only one income source, then  , /1
hi h hi h y y yy    and the first term 
above would be simply the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the average tax rate facing 
the unit: this is the standard expression for the revenue elasticity. The second term 
shows the modifications arising from the eligible expenditures and allowances, which 
are involved in the transformation from gross to taxable income, and the central and 
regional tax credits. Special cases of this result apply for situations where tax credits 
are greater or equal than the tax liability after the application of the tax schedule.   
 
3.1  Illustrative Examples 
This subsection illustrates the way in which the tax revenue elasticity varies for 
individuals in Spain. Following the Spanish tax code operating in 2007, attention is 
concentrated on just two sources of income and on the effects of varying eligible 
expenditures, allowances and tax credits as gross income increases. The first income 
source includes: labour income; alimony; self employment income; income from 
property and income applications to shareholders coming from Corporations under 
the fiscal transparency regime (similar to S-Corporations in the USA). The second 11 
 
income source includes: capital gains and any form of income derived from financial 
savings such as interest rates from bank accounts and deposits, share dividends, bond 
interest or any other type of yield earned from debt saving instruments. Incomes 
include both monetary compensations and fringe benefits. 
 
The allowable tax deductions,E , are income related specific deductions which 
generally include a shortlist of necessary expenditures incurred in order to earn the 
relevant income. Good examples of this are the employee Social Security 
contributions and union membership fees for labour income, loan interest payments, 
maintenance costs or economic depreciation in the case of property income, or a 
restricted list of some operating expenses from savings or entrepreneurship. Together 
with this, E entails the existence of a fixed labour-specific tax deduction of 4,000 € 
for earnings less than or equal to 9,000 €. Notwithstanding, this tax deduction turns 
out to be income-decreasing for earnings between 9,000 € and 13,000 € and 
becoming fixed again at a reduced amount of 2,600 € for earnings of 13,000 € and 
above.  
 
Allowances,  A, incorporate non-specific tax allowances and deductions. This 
includes paid palimony, contributions to Pension Schemes and personal and family 
allowances. Examples of the latter are the allowances recognized for special 
circumstances such as age, disability or the existence of dependants (ancestors and/or 
descendants). These non-specific income allowances are normally capped and 
present some limitations for its application in terms of the taxpayer’s income level 
and type of income. Finally, tax credits include all non-refundable tax relief enjoyed 
by the taxpayers in order to compute the final tax due after applying the tax 
schedules. For a detailed description of the specific quantities applied in year 2007 
see Agencia Tributaria (2008), and for an evolution of all these concepts through 
time in the Spanish case, see Romero and Sanz-Sanz (2007).  
 
The marginal rates and thresholds for the first income source are shown in Table 1. 
For the second source, tax is paid at fixed central and regional (marginal and average) 














0 0.1566  0.0834  0.24 
17,360 0.1827 0.0973 0.28 
32,360 0.2414 0.1286 0.37 
52,360 0.2713 0.1587 0.43 
 
Four different cases, for parameters listed in Table 2, are illustrated. In each case a 
fixed ratio of income from the two sources is assumed, whereby source two is 10 per 
cent of source one. Case 1 takes the (unrealistic) extreme of fixed eligible expenses, 
allowances and credits. The following cases gradually introduce elasticities, assumed 
to be constant, so that Case 4 allows all deductions and credits to vary as income 
varies. For example, in obtaining the values of expenditures, and so on, the following 





hi hi EE y
   (24) 
The various elasticities, such as  , ii Ey  , are referred to here as ‘ancillary elasticities’, 
and their estimation for Spain is described in the following Section, with values 
reported in Appendix D. For estimation purposes, a major aim was to allow for as 
much population heterogeneity as possible. For present illustrative purposes the 














Table 2  Alternative Parameters for Four Cases 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
Source  1      
E0  3500 98  98  98 
Elasticity 0  0.4  0.4  0.4 
A0  5000 5000 7000 7000 
Elasticity  0 0 0.005  0.005 
Source  2      
E0  35 0.3  0.3  0.3 
Elasticity 0  0.8  0.8  0.8 
A0  5000 5000 4750 4750 
Elasticity  0 0 0.05  0.05 
Credits      
CC0  1200 1200 1200 800 
Elasticity  0 0 0 0.05 
CR0 550 550 550 13 
Elasticity  0 0 0 0.4 
 
The resulting variations in individual revenue elasticities are shown in Figures 1 to 4. 
Clearly the highest elasticity values are obtained when expenditures, deductions and 
credits are fixed. Tax unit elasticities can become extremely high where income is 
just above the tax threshold where units begin to pay tax: in the limit – right at the 
threshold – the elasticity is of course infinitely high because the denominator (the 
initial tax paid) is zero. This property influences the distribution of elasticities 
discussed in the following Section. 
 
From Figure 1, no tax is paid until total income reaches approximately 16,775 €, 
when income from the first source becomes subject to the regional government rate 
of 0.0834 and income from the second source is taxed at the regional government rate 
of 0.069. At these levels, just above the threshold when the individual begins to pay 
tax, the revenue elasticity is very high. It then falls, until a total income of about 
17,875 € is reached. At this point, the individual’s incomes from both sources are 
taxed at both the central government and regional rates, so that the marginal tax rates 
applying to sources one and two are 0.24 and 0.18 respectively. On crossing into the 
higher marginal tax rate brackets, the revenue elasticity shoots up again, after which 
it declines steadily until reaching the next threshold.  
 
When total income is about 28600 €, the marginal tax rate applied to income from the 
first source becomes 0.28 (the combined central and regional rates), and a smaller 14 
 
jump in the revenue elasticity is observed. The next income threshold is about 45,100 
€ when income from the first source begins to be taxed at a combined rate of 0.37. 
The effect is that the pattern of revenue elasticities displays the familiar ‘saw tooth’ 
pattern. 
 
Figure 1  Variation in Individual Revenue Elasticity with Total Gross 



























































































































Figure 2  Variation in Individual Revenue Elasticity with Total Gross 














































































Case 2, where positive ancillary elasticities are introduced for eligible expenditures, 
the pattern is similar to that for Case 1, although of course the effective income 
thresholds are different. Thus initially only regional government taxes are paid in 
relation to both income sources, then another threshold is reached where central 
government tax rates are also applied. The individual then gradually moves into the 
higher tax brackets relating to the first income source. Similar characteristics apply 
when, in Case 3, ancillary elasticities for allowances are also positive.  
Figure 3  Variation in Individual Revenue Elasticity with Total Gross 

























































































































Figure 4  Variation in Individual Revenue Elasticity with Total Gross 



























































































































Case 4, where all ancillary elasticities are positive, gives rise to a slightly different 
pattern. In this case the income level, of about 23,375 €, at which the individual 
begins to pay tax involves paying only the central government rates of 0.1566 and 
0.111 for the first and second income source respectively. Very soon after this, at the 
level of 23,650 €, the individual pays tax on both income sources at the combined 
central and regional rates of 0.24 and 0.18 for the two sources. A kink, or ‘tooth’ 
arises in the revenue elasticity curve at the income of 34,100 €, when income source 
one attracts the higher combined marginal tax rate of 0.28. Then at 51,700 €, the 
individual moves into the next tax bracket for this source, with a marginal rate of 
0.37. Movement to the top marginal tax bracket is not shown in the diagram. 
4  Empirical Estimates 
This section presents estimated values of the individual revenue elasticity as defined 
in equation (23). Results were obtained using the Personal Income Tax information 
reported for a sample of 896,390 Spanish tax units. The original dataset comes from a 
cross-sectional dataset from the Spanish Tax Agency for year 2002. The data were 
adjusted to tax year 2007 and the simulated personal income tax is the one that came 
into force in January 2007.  
 
The first step was to compute the ancillary elasticities relating to the variation in 
expenditures and allowances. An important priority was to allow for as much 
heterogeneity as possible. For each of the 15 Autonomous Communities, the sample 
was split into subsamples according to 5 quantiles of total gross income, and within 
each quantile by the size of the tax unit. In the latter case three categories were used 
consisting of: one member; two members; and three or more members. Therefore, the 
total sample was divided into 225 subsamples (1 553   ), and for each of these 225 
subsamples the ancillary elasticities were obtained by running the following Tobit 
regression (where the sampling weight of each tax unit was taken into account): 
  , log log log hz y h h zy Q        (25) 
Where z is the relevant variable for which the constant elasticity,  , zy  , with respect to 
total gross income is required (that is,  12121 ,,,,, a n d CR y yEEA C C ), and the matrix Q 
represents a set of dummy variables capturing the type of tax-return (joint or separate 17 
 
filing), marital status (four categories) and type of main source of income (three 
categories). 
 
As a consequence of the procedure described above 1,575 estimations were run 
(seven ancillary elasticities for each of the 225 subgroups). The tables in Appendix D 
report the ancillary elasticities for each region according to the quantile and the size 
of the tax unit. These Tables report the required elasticities as long as they are 
statistically significant at a significance level of 5 per cent – otherwise a zero is 
reported. 
 
For the case of 
2 h Ay  the procedure was slightly different, as follows. The values of 
2 A  are positive only if the magnitude of  1 A  has not been entirely absorbed by the 
first income source  1 y . In those cases, the excess of  1 A  can be transferred as an 
allowance to reduce the second source of income  2 y . Thus  2 A  is positive only for 
tax units for whom  1 y  is sufficiently small not to absorb all its entitled  1 A . In other 
words, tax units which are rich in income from source 1 will not enjoy any transfer 
and as a result they will have 0 2  A . This fact is confirmed by the basic data as can 
be seen in the tables reported in Appendix D, which report the magnitude of  2 A  by 
quantiles of  1 y .  
 
As a result, the ancillary elasticity 
2 h Ay   was calculated following the same procedure 
as for the other ancillary elasticities, but using the quintiles of  1 y instead of  h y . 
Specifically,  2 A  exists only for the first two quintiles of  1 y  and mainly in the first 
one, so that the elasticity is reported in greater detailed for the first quintile (divided 
into three household sizes) whereas the rest of the tabulated quintiles are taken 
together without discriminating by household size. As can be seen, 
2 h Ay  is zero for 
the last 4 quintiles of  1 y  and negative for the first quintile regardless of household 
size and region. There are three exceptions: Andalucia; Castilla y León; and Cataluña 
present a strong positive elasticity for the second quintile. 
 18 
 
To compute the remaining terms in equation (23) for each tax unit, the 2007 tax 
structure was applied to each tax unit in the sample. For each tax unit the appropriate 
values of  1 y ,  2 y ,  t y ,  1 A ,  2 A ,  C C ,  r C and the marginal tax rates levied on each 








and the average tax rate ( ATR). The last segment of Appendix C reports some basic 
statistics for relevant variables, both for the whole country and for each of the 
Autonomous Communities (regions). 
 
All the ingredients of 
h h y T  were thus available for each tax unit, and Summary 
measures of the distribution of individual elasticities are reported in Table 3 for each 
region. 
 
Table 3  Quartiles of Individual Revenue Elasticities by Region and for The 
Whole Country 
   Lower quartile Median 
Upper 
quartile 
National 1.1214  1.4082  1.7761 
Andalucia 0.9673 1.3004  1.6172 
Aragon 1.1128  1.3819 1.8037 
Asturias 1.1414  1.4731  1.9418 
Baleares 1.0127  1.3865  1.9085 
Canarias 1.0207  1.3504  1.7578 
Cantabria 1.2341 1.5071  1.8395 
Castilla-Leon 1.0710  1.3829  1.7248 
Castilla-
LaMancha 1.0553  1.3905  1.7490 
Cataluña 1.1874  1.3660  1.6667 
Valencia 1.0806  1.3706  1.8863 
Extremadura 0.9384  1.3016  1.6013 
Galicia 0.9480  1.3297 1.8183 
Madrid 1.2896  1.5507 1.8279 
Murcia 1.1164  1.4429 1.9578 
Rioja 1.1214  1.4082  1.7761 
 
 
The distribution of individual revenue elasticities is of course highly skewed because 
those individuals who are just above an income threshold have very high revenue 
elasticities, as discussed in the previous Section.  19 
 
Further details regarding the distribution of individual elasticities can be illustrated 
using ‘box plots’, as in Figures 5 to 7, which provide a graphical representation of the 
main characteristics of a given distribution. A box plot is formed by a box, two 
‘whiskers’ and two ‘fences’, as follows. The right border of the box is the upper 
quartile; the left border is the lower quartile; and the line inside the box is the median. 
Hence the width of the box shows the inter-quartile range. The whiskers are the two 
horizontal lines to the left and right of the box which end in two vertical lines known 
as the fences. The right fence shows the highest value of the distribution that is 
smaller than or equal to the third quartile plus 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. The 
left fence shows the lowest value of the distribution that is greater than or equal to the 
first quartile minus 1.5 times the inter-quartile range. The box therefore indicates the 
dispersion and the skewness of the distribution. 
 
 
Figure 5  Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Income Quintile and Size 
of Tax Unit: All Regions 
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Figure 6  Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Main Income and Marital 
Status: All Regions 
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Figure 7  Distribution of Individual Elasticities by Autonomous Community 
in Common Territory 











































The boxes on the left hand side of each figure refer to all tax units, and thus include 
all those with a zero tax liability. When the elasticities are classified by income 
quintiles, it can be seen that there are nurerous negative elasticities, many of which 
are large in absolute terms. These negative elasticities are associated mainly with tax 
units who pay small amounts of personal income tax but have low incomes and 
ancillary elasticities which are greater than unity; thus (some of) the eligible 
expenditures, allowances and tax credits increase by more than gross income. The 
dispersion is substantially affected by whether all tax units are included, or whether 
attention is restricted to those who pay positive amounts of personal income tax. 
 
There is little variation in the dispersion of individual revenue elasticities, classified 
by tax unit size. Those whose main source of income is entrepreneurial income have 
a lower dispersion when only taxpayers are included, compared with the population 
of all tax units. This result is affected by the great ability of such tax units to claim 
substantial amounts of eligible expenditure and allowances.   
 
4.1  The Aggregate Revenue Elasticity 
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and: 












   (27) 
The elasticity of aggregate revenue with respect to aggregate income is thus a tax-
share weighted average of the product of individual revenue elasticities and the 
elasticity of individual income with respect to total income. Hence it depends not 
only the tax structure but on the extent to which individual incomes change when 
aggregate income changes. And, as shown above, the individual revenue elasticities 
depend on the extent to which the components of individuals’ incomes change as 
each individual’s income changes.  22 
 
 
In order to show the relevance of taking into account the schedular design of the tax 
as well as the rules that affect the definition of the taxable income and the final tax 
due, it is of interest to consider alternative measures of the aggregate revenue 
elasticity. Allowing for progressively more flexibility or endogeneity of deductions 




























   (29) 
   3
11
hi h hi h hi h
II
kih hi kih







              (30) 
 
Along with (23), which gives, say,  4h  .  
 
Table 4  Aggregate Revenue Elasticities:  , 1
h yY    
   1    2    3    4   
National  2.0732 2.1010 1.6238 1.3516 
Andalucía  2.2403 2.2444 1.6813 1.2231 
Aragón  2.1577 2.0983 1.5823 1.3266 
Asturias  2.1926 2.2358 1.7334 1.4369 
Baleares  2.0425 2.0047 1.5878 1.3282 
Canarias  2.1566 2.1250 1.6885 1.3235 
Cantabria  2.1645 2.1011 1.5900 1.3164 
Castilla-León  2.2493 2.2275 1.5390 1.2051 
Castilla-La  Mancha  2.3570 2.3310 1.7721 1.2842 
Cataluña  1.9944 1.9501 1.5615 1.3668 
Valencia  2.1714 2.1569 1.6281 1.3026 
Extremadura  2.3600 2.2622 1.6661 1.0762 
Galicia  2.1924 2.1721 1.6028 1.1985 
Madrid  1.8614 2.0515 1.6300 1.5057 
Murcia  2.2954 2.2725 1.8047 1.3189 




In obtaining results reported here, the assumption was made that  , h yY   is unity; that 
is, all incomes move in the same proportion.The resulting aggregate elasticities are 
shown in Table 4. The elasticity  1   assumes not only that all deductions and credits 
are fixed irrespective of income, but that the two sources of income remain in fixed 
proportions for all individuals. The second elasticity,  2  , uses information about the 
(cross-sectional) variation in income proportions to attribute an elasticity  , hi h yy   to 
each tax unit’s income source. This has a relatively small effect on the revenue 
elasticity estimates. Larger effects are observed where eligible expenditures and 
deductions, and then tax credits, vary with tax unit income: in each case the 
aggregate revenue elasticity falls when the ancillary elasticities are used.  
 
The revenue elasticities in the final column of Table 4 vary from just over 1.0 to 
about 1.5. The variation across regions arises from regional differences in gross 
incomes, since all regions face similar tax structures.   
 
In general, the aggregate values are similar to those reported for a number of other 
countries. On the US, see Fries et al. (1982), Dye and McGuire (1991) and 
Ram(1991). UK results are reported in Johnson and Lambert (1989) and Creedy and 
Gemmell (2004a, 2006, pp. 113). Canadian estimates are given by King and 
McMorran (2002)
10, and for New Zealand see Creedy and Gemmell (2004b, 2006, 
p.171). Lower elasticities of around 1, using time series methods, are given for 
Turkey by Kuştepeli and Şapçi (2006).  
 
In considering the revenue elasticities reported above, it should be remembered that 
they relate to revenue changes associated with changes in gross incomes. Many 
empirical studies actually begin not from gross income but from taxable income; that 
is, measured income has already been adjusted for eligible expenditures and 
allowances, so that the tax function can be applied directly as a function of taxable 
income.  
                                                 
10 They found a large variation between 1994 and 1998 of between 1.8 and 2.9, but judged the 
‘underlying’ value to be 1.4. For medium term revenue forecasting, they proposed values in the range 
1 to 1.3.  24 
 
 
In the case of a single income source, where x and y are, as above, taxable and gross 
income, and tax paid is    Txy , then the revenue elasticity is    ,, , Ty Tx xy   
. 
 
Furthermore, writing x yD , where D refers to all allowances and deductions, it 
can be shown that: 
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    
  
 (31) 
Where  , D y   is the elasticity of deductions with respect to gross income. It is clear 
from (33) that if  , 1 Dy   , then  , 1 xy    and the revenue elasticity with respect to 
gross income exceeds the revenue elasticity with respect to taxable income.  
 
In the following Section, which turns to the modelling of aggregate tax revenue, it is 
shown that a large simplification is possible when taking taxable income as the basis. 
4.2  Income Dynamics 
The above estimates, in common with most studies, are obtained on the assumption 
that all incomes move together, so that  , h yY   is equal to unity. In the absence of direct 
information on the dynamic process of relative income changes from year to year, it 
is possible to consider the sensitivity of results to an assumed degree of regression 
towards, or away from, the geometric mean. Following Creedy and Gemmell (2006), 
suppose income dynamics can be described by the relationship: 
        , 11 l o g l o g
h yY h yE y      (32) 
where   log E y  is the mean log-income, or equivalently the logarithm of geometric 
mean income. The coefficient,  , therefore governs systematic movements within 
the income distribution. If  1    there are systematic equalising relative movements 
whereby those below the geometric mean income experience relative larger increases 
than those above the geometric mean, when total income increases. A value of  1    
implies systematic disequalising income movements. 
 
The effects on aggregate revenue elasticities of differential income changes are 
shown in Tables 5 and 6, which may be compared with Table 4.  25 
 
 
Table 5  Aggregate Elasticities:  0.9    
   1    2    3    4   
National  1.9480 1.9712 1.5054 1.2198 
Andalucia  2.1274 2.1296 1.5763 1.0999 
Aragon  2.0504 1.9930 1.4908 1.2216 
Asturias  2.0856 2.1240 1.6314 1.3162 
Baleares  1.9115 1.8804 1.4735 1.1989 
Canarias  2.0382 2.0046 1.5786 1.2075 
Cantabria  2.0536 1.9801 1.4814 1.1933 
Castilla-Leon 2.1476 2.1293 1.4575 1.1062 
Castilla-LaMancha  2.2517 2.2303 1.6850 1.1769 
Cataluña  1.8706 1.8327 1.4545 1.2495 
Valencia  2.0523 2.0371 1.5170 1.1748 
Extremadura  2.2580 2.1673 1.5848 0.9714 
Galicia  2.0775 2.0660 1.5045 1.0815 
Madrid  1.7203 1.8873 1.4778 1.3467 
Murcia  2.1804 2.1536 1.6966 1.1882 
Rioja  2.0842 2.0290 1.5471 1.2705 
 
 
Table 6  Aggregate Elasticities:  1.1    
   1    2    3    4   
Nacional  2.1984 2.2309 1.7422 1.4834 
Andalucia  2.3532 2.3593 1.7862 1.3462 
Aragon  2.2650 2.2037 1.6737 1.4317 
Asturias  2.2995 2.3477 1.8353 1.5577 
Baleares  2.1735 2.1290 1.7022 1.4575 
Canarias  2.2750 2.2455 1.7985 1.4396 
Cantabria  2.2755 2.2222 1.6986 1.4395 
Castilla-Leon  2.3510 2.3257 1.6205 1.3040 
Castilla-LaMancha  2.4623 2.4318 1.8592 1.3914 
Cataluña  2.1181 2.0675 1.6686 1.4841 
Valencia  2.2905 2.2766 1.7392 1.4305 
Extremadura  2.4620 2.3570 1.7474 1.1810 
Galicia  2.3074 2.2783 1.7011 1.3154 
Madrid  2.0024 2.2157 1.7822 1.6647 
Murcia  2.4103 2.3914 1.9128 1.4496 







Further detail of the effect of income dynamics can be seen in Figure 4, for the case 
of the national aggregate revenue elasticity. It can be seen that the elasticity varies 
linearly with  .  
 















































The increase in the revenue elasticity as   increases is associated with the resulting 
rise in income inequality as those below the geometric mean experience relatively 
smaller percentage income increases. The larger proportion of the population just 
above the lower income thresholds implies an increase in the number of tax units 
having larger revenue elasticities. The decline in the elasticities associated with the 
higher income groups is relatively small, as can be seen from the shapes of the 
elasticity profiles shown above. Hence, in aggregate the revenue elasticity increases 
with  . 
 
The linearity of the schedule in Figure 8 can be seen by substituting (31) into (27), 
whereby: 
     ,, ,
11











      
    (33) 
 
Although no direct evidence is available here, it is unlikely that   deviates far from 
unity. For example, a value of  0.9    would be considered low, implying for 27 
 
example that if total income were to increase by 10 per cent, the lower quartile would 
increase by about 14 per cent whereas the upper quartile would increase by only 
about 3 per cent. This implies considerable ‘regression towards the (geometric) 
mean’.
11  
5  Total Tax Revenue 
This section turns to modelling aggregate tax revenue and its components. First, it is 
shown that in view of the complexity of the Spanish tax structure, it is not possible to 
express total revenue as a convenient function of proportions of people and 
proportions of total income within the tax brackets, or adjacent gross income 
thresholds. However, further progress can be made by taking taxable income as the 
basic distribution. 
 
5.1  Aggregation over Individuals 
Total revenue, T , is made up of revenue from the three categories discussed in 
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Given the existence of the different income sources and the application of the non-
refundable tax credits to total income tax liability at central and regional levels 
(rather than applying to each source), and the existence of different tax structures for 
                                                 
11 Random variations in proportional income changes, in addition to the systematic regression, can – if 
sufficiently large – lead to an increase in overall inequality; see Creedy (1985).  28 
 
different income sources, the above expression for total revenue cannot be reduced to 
a convenient expression in terms of characteristics of the distributions of component 
gross income sources.  
 
However, further progress can be made by considering as the starting point, instead 
of the distribution of gross income, the distribution of taxable income, x. Indeed, as 
discussed in subsection 4.1, many studies of revenue elasticities take this variable as 
the ‘given’ distribution and define the elasticity of tax revenue with respect to 
changes in taxable income rather than gross income. For the  CR n   taxpayers whose 
central and regional tax exceeds the relevant credits, equations (10) and (11) can be 
used to write their tax as: 
  1,
11 1
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   (35) 
which becomes: 
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   . If there are N taxpayers (that is, whose tax liability 
is positive, so that  CR R C Nn n n    ), the total revenue can be expressed as: 
   
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      (37) 
Where, as above,  hi x is the taxable income for income source i for tax unit h (that is, 
hi hi hi hi A E y x    ). The terms  C C  and  R C  denote the appropriate average value 
defined over taxpayers, remembering the tax schedule asymmetry whereby tax must 
be positive. The first term in (37) can be rewritten as: 








    (38) 
In the case of a single source of income, with a multi-step function, the tax per person 
can be expressed in terms of summary information about the distribution of taxable 
income, which determines the proportion of tax units falling into the various marginal 29 
 
tax rate groups.
12 For example, suppose that    Fx denotes the distribution function 
of taxable income, x>0. Tax per unit is thus: 
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Define   1 Fx  as the first-moment distribution function, that is the proportion of total 
income of units below x, and introduce the general term    k Ga , defined as: 




Ga Fa Fa Fa Fa
x
     (40) 
The first term in curly brackets gives the proportion of total income between adjacent 
thresholds, and the second term in curly brackets is the number of tax units between 
those thresholds. The expression in (40) can also be written as:  
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 (41) 
The first term inside the square brackets of (41) is the slope of the Lorenz curve of 
the relevant distribution of income, between the two points associated with adjacent 
income tax thresholds. The Lorenz curve has a slope of 45 degrees at the arithmetic 





 . The second term in the square brackets is simply the 
ratio of the ‘effective’ threshold to arithmetic mean income. And of course the term 
in curly brackets in (41) is the proportion of people within the tax bracket.  
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Hence, for the case of several income sources, each with its own tax schedule, total 
tax revenue over all individuals and sources becomes: 
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12 For further discussion, see Creedy and Gemmell (2006). 30 
 
The first term in equation (43) can usefully be written in vector notation. Define the 











































Then, if a prime indicates that the vector is written as a row vector: 
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These values may be placed in a column vector, denoted   ' tG. Then if x  represents 
a column vector whose ith element consists of the arithmetic mean,  i x , then:  













   (47) 
where, as before, a prime indicates transposition. This allows the effects of tax and 
income distribution changes to be easily examined. 
 
5.2  Empirical Application 
This subsection reports the values of the various terms involved in obtaining total tax 
revenue, derived in the previous subsection. First, Table 7 gives, for each region and 
for all regions combined, the number of individuals who pay positive amounts of tax, 
along with the arithmetic means of the two income sources. The final two columns of 
Table 7 show the arithmetic means of the central and regional tax credits, which 
together give the last term in equation (43). There are clearly substantial differences 




Table 7  Number of Taxpayers (with positive tax) and Arithmetic Means of 
Taxable Incomes and Tax Credits (€s) 
   N   1 x   2 x   C C   R C  
National  12,229,939 20,816.74  2,220.59 1,228.84 646.27 
Andalucía  1,772,425 19,148.92 1,686.22  1,254.13  660.46 
Aragón  480,016  19,239.42  2,338.24 1,190.27 626.56 
Asturias  362,701  19,894.59  1,648.66 1,203.68 634.44 
Baleares  311,943  20,006.38  2,313.47 1,176.61 619.04 
Canarias  472,742  20,330.13  1,439.27 1,259.68 661.04 
Cantabria  181,796  19,546.91  2,287.14 1,220.81 642.94 
Castilla-León  790,965  18,619.11  1,889.49 1,208.71 636.20 
Castilla-La  Mancha  469,160  17,565.85  1,563.90 1,216.59 640.83 
Cataluña  2,473,158 22,266.55 2,506.11  1,225.06  643.65 
Valencia  1,391,005 18,720.08 2,278.14  1,197.66  630.46 
Extremadura  244,384  17,149.91  1,378.86 1,190.61 628.12 
Galicia  730,355  18,520.83  1,763.29 1,161.04 612.92 
Madrid  2,131,743 25,885.79 3,096.36  1,279.47  670.80 
Murcia  309,242  18,780.95  1,729.87 1,271.32 669.52 
Rioja  108,306  18,529.28  2,540.61 1,212.06 637.13 
 
 
The expression for aggregate revenue in each region requires the various proportions 
of people and proportions of income at each of the tax thresholds. This is simple for 
the second source of income, since the tax function is linear. For the first income 
source, Tables 8 and 9 report values of the first moment distribution, and the 
distribution function, respectively for the required income thresholds. These two 
tables thus together give three points along the Lorenz curve of the first source of 
income in each region. For example, for all regions combined there are 
approximately five per cent of tax units (those paying positive tax) above the top 
threshold for income source 1, and they are responsible for about 20 per cent of total 
income from that source. However, for Madrid, eight per cent of positive taxpayers 
are above the top threshold, and they are responsible for about 30 per cent of total 








Table 8  Proportions of Total Taxable Income Below Thresholds (First 
Income Source) 
     12 Fa    13 Fa    14 Fa 
National  0.29019 0.63216 0.80771 
Andalucía  0.33006 0.69497 0.85926 
Aragón  0.32503 0.69809 0.86190 
Asturias  0.31424 0.70250 0.86856 
Baleares  0.32095 0.62923 0.80426 
Canarias  0.29832 0.63865 0.82860 
Cantabria  0.32786 0.68411 0.85049 
Castilla-León  0.34005 0.71888 0.88787 
Castilla-La  Mancha 0.38301 0.73908 0.89074 
Cataluña  0.25939 0.59872 0.77946 
Valencia  0.34565 0.68570 0.84315 
Extremadura  0.39003 0.74727 0.89608 
Galicia  0.34662 0.69615 0.86208 
Madrid  0.19713 0.50417 0.70211 
Murcia  0.34329 0.69763 0.86529 
Rioja  0.36322 0.70585 0.87476 
 
 
All that is required to obtain the values of G are the values of the effective tax 
thresholds, 'k a . For central and regional rates combined, the relevant values are 
2,480; 9,748.11 and 15,693.95. The resulting values of G are given in Table 10. From 
the analytical results derived above, for any tax bracket, multiplying G by the 
relevant tax rate gives the ratio of tax raised by the bracket per capita to the total 
income per capita. As the tax rates are common across regions, comparisons of the 
extent of revenue within each region, arising from income source 1, can be made by 
moving down the columns. The table shows the relative importance of the top tax 
bracket in Madrid, and the unimportance of the bottom tax bracket, compared with 
other regions.





                                                 
13 Separate values of G for Central and Regional tax schedules are shown in Appendix C. 33 
 
 
Table 9  Proportions of Taxpayers below Thresholds (First Income Source) 
     2 Fa     3 Fa     4 Fa  
National  0.56074 0.86344 0.95491 
Andalucía  0.59035 0.88808 0.96763 
Aragón  0.58030 0.88792 0.96704 
Asturias  0.55800 0.88570 0.96864 
Baleares  0.60398 0.86906 0.95701 
Canarias  0.57119 0.86188 0.95896 
Cantabria  0.58835 0.88265 0.96492 
Castilla-León  0.59488 0.89430 0.97353 
Castilla-La  Mancha 0.64104 0.90839 0.97528 
Cataluña  0.52079 0.84388 0.94432 
Valencia  0.61925 0.89186 0.96510 
Extremadura  0.65168 0.91198 0.97600 
Galicia  0.61687 0.89160 0.96861 
Madrid  0.45962 0.79380 0.92136 
Murcia  0.60652 0.89010 0.96956 
Rioja  0.62178 0.89268 0.97164 
 
 
Table 10  Values of G for each Tax Threshold  (First Income Source 
According to Total Tax Schedule) 
    1 Ga     2 Ga     3 Ga     4 Ga  
National  0.290193 0.305909 0.132714 0.158296 
Andalucía  0.330057 0.326354 0.123800 0.114204 
Aragón  0.325034 0.333407 0.123714 0.111220 
Asturias  0.314239 0.347408 0.125427 0.106700 
Baleares  0.320947 0.275424 0.132178 0.162015 
Canarias  0.298323 0.304869 0.143401 0.139719 
Cantabria  0.327856 0.318916 0.125351 0.121344 
Castilla-León  0.340052 0.338948 0.127502 0.089822 
Castilla-La  Mancha  0.383015 0.318322 0.114534 0.087180 
Cataluña  0.259386 0.303344 0.136769 0.181298 
Valencia  0.345647 0.303937 0.119315 0.127588 
Extremadura  0.390029 0.319601 0.112424 0.081951 
Galicia  0.346616 0.312747 0.125395 0.111321 
Madrid  0.197128 0.273870 0.148977 0.249379 
Murcia  0.343290 0.316890 0.126414 0.109277 






Table 11  Estimated Total Tax Revenue (€s) 





National  51,148,217,111 33,061,697,229 18,086,519,880 
Andalucía  6,155,788,630 3,972,274,107 2,183,514,522 
Aragón  1,776,894,526 1,145,725,113 631,169,413 
Asturias 1,352,992,058  874,123,198  478,868,860 
Baleares 1,271,754,868  818,791,512  452,963,356 
Canarias  1,810,355,523 1,167,961,396 642,394,127 
Cantabria  683,181,263 440,400,756 242,780,507 
Castilla-León  2,672,907,005 1,725,380,941 947,526,063 
Castilla-La Mancha  1,410,927,079  910,996,715  499,930,364 
Cataluña 11,679,310,225  7,520,720,015  4,158,590,210 
Valencia  4,981,828,923 3,209,163,568 1,772,665,355 
Extremadura  705,599,802 456,083,010 249,516,793 
Galicia  2,521,071,133 1,627,923,016 893,148,116 
Madrid 12,712,845,321  8,281,203,401  4,431,641,920 
Murcia 1,034,493,203  667,339,810  367,153,393 
Rioja  378,267,552 243,610,671 134,656,881 
 
For example, for all regions combined, the total income tax revenue, gross of the tax 
credits, is given from (47) by the total number of positive taxpayers multiplied by the 
term (where values for G are rounded to two decimal places for convenience): 
 
   
0.29
0.31




   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 (48) 
 
When the total amount of tax credits per (positive) taxpayer, of 1,228+646, is 
deducted from this result, the net tax per capita is obtained. Multiplying this value by 
the total number of taxpayers gives the value in the first row of Table 11.
14 Results 
are obtained for the regions simply by changing the vector of arithmetic mean 
                                                 
14 As a useful check on the programming of the calculations, aggregate revenue was obtained both 
using the formulae and by simply adding all the individual tax unit amounts, giving exactly the same 
results.  35 
 
incomes and the vector of G values in (48), and then using the appropriate values of 
N and the average tax credits. 
 
The effects on gross tax revenue of changes in the average income from the second 
source, or changes in the relative dispersion of income from the first source (which 
changes the Lorenz curve and thus the G values), or changes in the marginal tax rate 
structure, are thus easily examined using modifications to expressions of the form 
shown in (48). For example, elimination of the top marginal income tax bracket 
simply means that the row vector of tax rates has only three elements and the column 
vector of G values is reduced to three elements with the third element replaced by 
0.29.  
 
Changes in the tax thresholds have the effect of changing the G values. Hence a 
‘ready reckoner’ could be produced by replacing Tables 8 and 9 by larger tables 
giving values of the distribution function and first moment distribution function for a 
range of income levels. The introduction of additional tax brackets for the second 
income source could be accommodated by producing similar tables for that source.  
 
The effects of change in the distribution of income within a region can be examined 
using the same kind of summary information. For example, if mean income 
increases, whereby incomes in a region are assumed to increase by the same 
proportion, this is equivalent to a reduction in the tax thresholds, so that information 
about the Lorenz curve (the F and  1 F  values) can be used to obtain the appropriate G 
value. A change in inequality can be accommodated by specifying the way in which 
the Lorenz curve for the region changes.  
 
The difficulty of dealing with the central and regional tax credits and thus aggregate 
net income tax revenue remains, as an analytical expression for aggregate credits has 
not been obtained.  
 
As suggested above, the effects of changing only the tax rates are easily examined in 
this framework, as only the vector of marginal rates needs to be altered in expressions 
corresponding to (48). For example, the previous discussion has not allowed for the 36 
 
small change in the tax rate structure in Madrid in 2007, making it unique among the 
Spanish regions. The income thresholds for the first income source are the same as in 
Table 1 above, and the central government rates are the same, but the marginal tax 
rates for Madrid became 0.0794, 0.0943, 0.1266 and 0.1577 for the four income 
brackets. This involves a slight reduction in all the rates, with the largest reductions 
being for the first and second tax brackets. Given the nature of the distribution of 
income in Madrid for the first source, it is anticipated that this would have relatively 
little effect on total revenue. But in view of the differences among regions in their 
income distributions, the same could not be said of the other regions.   
 
The effects on total tax revenue, and revenue within each region, if all regions were 
to adopt the Madrid structure, can easily be obtained using the information given 
above. The percentage changes in total (central plus regional) tax revenue and in the 
regional tax revenue alone are shown in Table 12. In producing these values, it was 
assumed that the average tax credits within each region remain unchanged. Clearly 
the poorer regions, where a much larger proportion of total income is obtained by 
those who fall into the first two tax brackets, would experience substantially larger 
reductions in tax revenue.  
 
Table 12  Percentage Reduction in Tax Revenue from Adoption of Madrid’s 






National 1.7268  5.0096 
Andalucía 1.9868  5.8113 
Aragon 1.8754  5.4658 
Asturias 1.9240  5.6338 
Baleares 1.7081  4.9486 
Canarias 1.8697  5.4546 
Cantabria 1.8631  5.4260 
Castilla-Leon 2.0137  5.8968 
Castilla-LaMancha 2.1540  6.3276 
Cataluña 1.6141  4.6696 
Valencia 1.8701  5.4398 
Extremadura 2.2008 6.4844 
Galicia 1.9373  5.6687 
Madrid 1.3815  3.9630 
Murcia 2.0302  5.9393 
Rioja 1.9282  5.6124 37 
 
5.3  Regional Comparisons 
The previous subsection considered the effects on all regions of adopting a different 
regional structure of marginal income tax rates. As explained above, it is possible to 
use the same basic approach to consider the effects of a range of changes in the 
taxable income distributions of each region. This is particularly useful in the present 
context where it is clear that different regions have different fiscal capacities. Such 
disparities in regional revenue-raising abilities are especially evident when, as here, 
progressive taxes are assigned partially to regional governments.  
 
Central governments normally carry out some form of regional fiscal equalization. 
Under these circumstances, sound design of these inter-regional transfers requires a 
clear understanding of the precise sources of divergence of regional fiscal capacities. 
The present approach can thus contribute to the debate on regional transfers by 
clarifying precisely how regions differ with respect to the tax structure and the 
distribution of taxpayers. This is because equation (43) makes it evident that 
differences in revenue hinge on basically four factors: the number and distribution of 
taxpayers, the distribution of taxable incomes and the specific tax parameters that 
define the structure –marginal tax rates, tax bracket thresholds and average tax 
credits.  
 
The present approach makes it possible to construct a matrix in which each region’s 
tax revenue can be computed under the assumption that it shares one or more of the 
characteristics of other regions. Thus a ‘15 by 15’ matrix is obtained such that each 
entry shows the revenue obtained by a row region, under the assumption that it has a 
particular characteristic of the column region. The leading diagonal of such a square 
matrix obviously shows the actual revenue obtained by the region. This matrix is 
augmented by an additional row and column for the country as a whole. Similarly, 
the information can be displayed in relative terms, showing the percentage 
differences in revenue which could be raised by each region, given different assumed 
characteristics (so that each corresponding leading diagonal element is zero).  
 
To illustrate the kind of information which can be produced along these lines, Tables 
13 to 15 report three such hypothetical ‘16 by 16’ matrices for Spanish regions in the 38 
 
2007 fiscal year. These were computed using the sample of tax-returns described in 
section 4 and, as before, refer to the fifteen Autonomous Communities of the 
Common Territory. Each matrix shows the relative impact on the revenue collection 
of the row region if it were to replicate the specific characteristic of the column 
region. Specifically, Table 13 presents the revenue impact of differences in arithmetic 
mean taxable incomes. Table 14 depicts the effects of differences in the form of the 
relative taxable income distributions; that is, the arithmetic means are unchanged but 
the proportions of people in each tax bracket, and the corresponding proportions of 
total taxable income within each bracket, are assumed to the those of the region in the 
columns. Finally, Table 15 shows the revenue consequences of simultaneous changes 
in both the arithmetic mean taxable income and the relative distributions of income.
15  
 
For example, Table 13 shows that if Andalucía were to have the same arithmetic 
mean taxable income as Aragon (a given percentage change in all incomes), it would 
have 4.17 per cent higher income tax revenue. However, from Table 14 if Andalucia 
were to have its actual arithmetic mean, but the same relative form of income 
distribution as Aragon, it would have slightly less revenue: there would be a 
reduction of 0.40 per cent. Table 15 indicates that if the distribution of taxable 
income in Andalucia were the precisely the same as in Aragon (in both absolute and 
relative terms), its revenue would be 3.77 per cent higher. In fact these effects are 
additive, so that the elements of Table 15 effectively equal the sum of the 
corresponding elements in Tables 13 and 14.  
 
                                                 
15 In producing these results it has been assumed that average tax credits remain unchanged 39 
 
Table 13  Effects of Varying Arithmetic Mean Taxable Income (Row Region has Mean Income of Column Region) 




LM. Cat.  Val.  Extr.  Gal.  Mad.  Murc. Rioja 
National  0  -14.73 -11.26 -9.33 -5.65 -6.98 -9.19 -17.81 -27.07 12.04 -15.39 -30.96 -19.09 41.57 -17.29 -15.69 
Andalucia  17.31 0  4.17 6.30 10.72 9.01 6.58 -3.56 -14.43  31.42  -0.67  -19.02 -5.07  66.02  -2.98  -0.97 
Aragon  12.32 -3.91  0  2.00 6.15 4.54 2.26 -7.25 -17.44  25.55  -4.54  -21.74 -8.67  57.99  -6.70  -4.82 
Asturias  10.23 -5.86  -1.98  0  4.11 2.52 0.27 -9.17 -19.27  23.35  -6.47  -23.53 -10.57 55.50  -8.63  -6.75 
Baleares  5.80  -9.34 -5.77 -3.79 0  -1.38 -3.64 -12.50 -22.00 18.16 -10.01 -26.01 -13.81 48.49 -11.96 -10.31 
Canarias  7.62  -8.43 -4.63 -2.55 1.48  0  -2.37 -11.77 -21.85 20.73 -9.13 -26.10 -13.16 52.89 -11.21 -9.44 
Cantabria  9.96  -6.10  -2.24  -0.24  3.85 2.28 0  -9.42 -19.51  23.07  -6.74  -23.76 -10.82 55.20  -8.87  -7.03 
Castilla-Leon  21.17 3.60 7.87 9.98 14.51 12.71 10.31 0  -11.04  35.50  2.96 -15.69 -1.54  70.60  0.58 2.67 
Castilla-LaMancha 35.79  16.25 21.04 23.33 28.40 26.34 23.74 12.27  0  51.71 15.59 -5.18 10.55 90.71 12.90 15.29 
Cataluña -10.88  -24.18 -21.09 -19.29 -16.00 -17.15 -19.20 -26.99 -35.34 0  -24.82 -38.86 -28.13 26.70 -26.50 -25.11 
Valencia  17.50 0.66 4.71 6.80 11.09 9.44 7.06 -2.81 -13.38  31.24  0  -17.84 -4.28  64.91  -2.24  -0.30 
Extremadura  42.51  22.23 27.21 29.57 34.85 32.69 30.02 18.11  5.38  59.02 21.56 0  16.33 99.47 18.76 21.26 
Galicia  22.46 5.09 9.28 11.41 15.86 14.13 11.70 1.52  -9.39 36.62  4.43 -13.99 0  71.34  2.10 4.13 
Madrid -30.66  -41.48 -39.04 -37.47 -34.87 -35.68 -37.49 -43.81 -50.61 -21.79 -42.09 -53.46 -44.73 0  -43.39 -42.37 
Murcia  20.99 3.08 7.41 9.60 14.19 12.40 9.90 -0.60 -11.85  35.60  2.40 -16.59 -2.17  71.40  0  2.09 







Table 14  Effects of Varying Relative Incomes: Row Region has F and F1 of Column Region 




LM. Cat.  Val.  Extr. Gal. Mad.  Murc. Rioja 
National  0  -1.98  -2.32 -2.90 0.89 -0.70 -1.80 -3.15 -3.11 0.13 -0.84  -3.30 -1.69 1.69 -1.99 -2.44 
Andalucia  1.89  0  -0.40 -1.09 3.00 1.15 0.14 -1.21 -0.99 1.77 1.32 -1.15 0.40 2.89 0.04  -0.41 
Aragon  2.18  0.37 0  -0.65 3.21 1.47 0.51 -0.77 -0.57 2.07 1.61 -0.73 0.74 3.17 0.41  -0.02 
Asturias  2.99  1.02 0.65  0  4.01 2.25 1.18 -0.19 -0.06 3.00 2.27 -0.23 1.37 4.36 1.04  0.58 
Baleares  -0.93  -2.76 -3.10 -3.70 0  -1.61 -2.61 -3.88  -3.77  -0.91 -1.61 -3.93 -2.44 0.38  -2.74 -3.17 
Canarias  0.74  -1.29  -1.66 -2.29 1.73 0  -1.12 -2.52 -2.43 0.82 -0.06  -2.62 -0.96 2.32 -1.29 -1.76 
Cantabria  1.72  -0.14  -0.51 -1.15 2.73 1.00 0  -1.30 -1.14 1.66 1.08 -1.30 0.21 2.87 -0.11 -0.55 
Castilla-Leon  2.96  1.17 0.77  0.07 4.11 2.22 1.29 0  0.28  2.74 2.51 0.14 1.60 3.65 1.24  0.81 
Castilla-LaMancha  2.36  0.72 0.27  -0.50 3.68 1.61 0.80 -0.45 0  1.91 2.18 -0.11 1.23 2.38 0.83  0.42 
Cataluña  -0.30  -2.38 -2.68 -3.21 0.46 -0.99 -2.17 -3.55  -3.63  0  -1.33 -3.84 -2.15 1.86  -2.42 -2.89 
Valencia  0.45  -1.26  -1.64 -2.31 1.53 -0.25 -1.15 -2.38 -2.12 0.26 0  -2.26 -0.87 1.16 -1.20 -1.62 
Extremadura  2.30  0.74 0.27  -0.53 3.68 1.55 0.79 -0.42 0.10  1.74 2.24 0  1.28 2.01 0.87  0.47 
Galicia  1.30  -0.42  -0.81 -1.50 2.43 0.59 -0.31 -1.55 -1.27 1.07 0.89 -1.40 0  1.91 -0.35 -0.77 
Madrid  -2.98  -5.22 -5.47 -5.91 -2.43 -3.65 -4.96 -6.39  -6.68  -2.39 -4.33 -6.92 -5.10 0  -5.32 -5.81 
Murcia  1.79  -0.06  -0.47 -1.18 2.95 1.04 0.07 -1.26 -1.00 1.60 1.29 -1.15 0.36 2.59 0  -0.45 






Table 15  Effects of Varying Mean Taxable Income and its Distribution: Row Region has Distribution of Column Region 




LM. Cat.  Val.  Extr.  Gal.  Mad.  Murc. Rioj. 
National  0  -16.30 -13.18 -11.99 -4.75 -7.66 -10.72 -20.19 -28.76 12.38 -15.78 -32.54 -20.16 45.86 -18.72 -17.39 
Andalucia  19.69  0  3.77  5.20  13.96 10.44 6.74  -4.71  -15.06 34.65 0.63  -19.63 -4.66 75.11 -2.92 -1.32 
Aragon  14.94  -3.54 0  1.35  9.56  6.26  2.79  -7.95  -17.66 28.97 -2.94 -21.95 -7.91 66.93 -6.28 -4.78 
Asturias  13.49  -4.85 -1.34 0  8.15  4.87  1.43  -9.23  -18.86 27.42 -4.26 -23.12 -9.19 65.08 -7.57 -6.08 
Baleares  4.89  -11.89 -8.68 -7.46 0  -3.00 -6.15 -15.90 -24.72 17.63 -11.36 -28.61 -15.86 52.09 -14.38 -13.02 
Canarias  8.39  -9.47 -6.05 -4.75 3.19  0  -3.36 -13.74 -23.12 21.96 -8.89 -27.27 -13.69 58.65 -12.12 -10.67 
Cantabria  11.97  -6.23 -2.74 -1.42 6.67  3.42  0  -10.58 -20.14 25.80 -5.64 -24.37 -10.54 63.19 -8.93 -7.45 
Castilla-Leon  25.08 4.84 8.71 10.19 19.18 15.56 11.76 0  -10.64  40.45  5.49 -15.34 0.05 82.03  1.83 3.48 
Castilla-LaMancha 40.13  17.39 21.74 23.40 33.51 29.44 25.17 11.95  0  57.41 18.12 -5.28 12.01 104.13 14.01 15.86 
Cataluña -11.00  -25.48 -22.71 -21.66 -15.22 -17.81 -20.53 -28.95 -36.56 0  -25.02 -39.92 -28.91 29.75 -27.63 -26.46 
Valencia  18.49  -0.61 3.04  4.44  12.93 9.51  5.92  -5.18  -15.21 32.99 0  -19.65 -5.13 72.22 -3.45 -1.89 
Extremadura  47.30  23.61 28.14 29.87 40.40 36.17 31.72 17.95  5.50  65.29 24.37 0  18.00 113.96 20.09 22.02 
Galicia  24.51 4.69 8.48 9.93 18.74 15.19 11.47 -0.05 -10.46  39.55  5.32 -15.06 0  80.26  1.75 3.36 
Madrid -31.83  -43.15 -40.98 -40.16 -35.13 -37.15 -39.27 -45.85 -51.79 -23.24 -42.78 -54.42 -45.82 0  -44.83 -43.90 
Murcia  23.48 3.04 6.95 8.44 17.53 13.87 10.03 -1.85 -12.60  39.01  3.69 -17.34 -1.80  81.01  0  1.66 
Rioja  20.90 1.31 5.06 6.49 15.20 11.69 8.02 -3.37 -13.66  35.77  1.94 -18.20 -3.32  76.00  -1.59  0 
 
 
 6  Conclusions 
The aim of this paper was to derive analytical expressions for aggregate revenue and 
the revenue elasticity of the Spanish personal income tax system as applied to tax 
units and in aggregate. This was considerably complicated by the schedular nature of 
the system, the role of central and regional governments, along with the existence of 
a range of tax credits and eligible expenditures and deductions.  
 
Empirical estimates of revenue elasticities were obtained using a large cross-sectional 
data set which enabled a number of important ancillary elasticities (relating to 
allowances and tax credits, and different income sources) to be estimated. The 
functional relationship between gross income and personal income taxation was 
examined, rather than starting from a given distribution of taxable income.  
 
It was found that there is considerable variation among tax units in the revenue 
elasticity, with highly (positively) skewed distributions. Similarly, the aggregate 
elasticities for each region were found to vary, associated with variations in the 
income distributions. Variations were around a value of about 1.3.  
 
Formal expressions for aggregate tax revenue were derived, in terms of the 
distribution of taxable income. It was possible to separate total revenue into 
components relating to the income tax structure and summary measures of the 
distribution of taxable income, in particular the proportions of taxpayers, and of total 
taxable income, in each tax bracket. It was thus possible to examine the sources of 
differences among regions.  
 
It is suggested that the approach developed here is of value not only in understanding 
the fiscal drag and ‘automatic stabilisation’ properties of the personal tax structure, 
but in considering the factors – particularly the nature of the distribution of taxable 





Appendix A. Losses as a Proportion of Income 
Section 2 refers briefly to the role of losses in the Spanish personal tax system. The 
first column of Table 16 reports negative (general) taxable income generated each tax 
year, as a proportion of the tax year’s current taxable income. The second column 
contains the proportion of the negative taxable income, carried forward from the last 
four tax years, used to offset current (general) taxable income. It can be seen that the 
amount of negative taxable income generated each tax year is well below 1 per cent. 
Furthermore, the amount of carried-forward taxable income from the last four years 
to offset against current taxable income is even less relevant in relative terms, being 
well below 0.1 per cent. As with corporation losses, many losses are not used by the 
taxpayers and becoming ‘stranded’. Hence, the loss asymmetry in the tax function is 
of little relevance in determining the aggregate tax liability. 
 
 






% of generated negative taxable 
income  
% of used negative taxable income 
(coming from previous four years) 
1997 0.18  0.06 
1998 0.22  0.05 
1999
*  less than 0.35  0.06 
2000
*  less than 0.39   0.06 
2001
*  less than 0.74   0.06 
2002 0.55  0.07 
2003 0.54  0.06 
2004 0.48  0.06 
2005 0.5  0.05 
2006 0.4  0.06 
Source: Memorias de la Administracion Tributaria (Tax Office's Annual Tax Report), 
several years. 
(*) This figures includes not only negative taxable income but taxable income up to
3,000 € 44 
 
Appendix B. The Treatment of Allowances 
This appendix considers refundable and non-refundable tax allowances. Suppose 
there is a simple tax structure with a marginal rate of t applied to income, y in excess 
of a, and there is a ‘refundable tax credit’ of b. The term ‘refundable’ means that if 
income tax is less than b, the individual receives a payment (pays negative tax). The 
net tax paid is 
      Ty ty a b    (B1) 
The total expenditure on the refundable tax credit b remains fixed, so long as the 
population size is fixed. Those with incomes between a and  / ab t   pay some 
income tax but face an overall negative average tax rate.  
 
For taxpayers, net income is    1 y ta t b    and the tax-free threshold can be 
regarded as giving rise to a kind of tax credit worth at. This is a ‘non-refundable tax 
credit’, such that those with y<a receive nothing.   
 
The non-refundable credit is intimately connected with the income tax structure. It 
determines who pays a zero marginal income tax rate, and the size of the ‘non-
refundable credit’ is determined by the tax rate as well as a. The total ‘tax 
expenditure’ associated with the threshold a varies as the tax rate and the income 
distribution changes: it increases as the number of people above the threshold 
increases.  
 























Hence for those with positive net average tax rates, the elasticity is higher when b is 
included (essentially because it lowers their average tax rate). A higher value of the 
refundable tax credit b has the effect of raising the revenue elasticity.  45 
 
 
Alternatively, it is possible simply to think of the two components of the structure 
separately. It could be said to combine an income tax with a tax-free threshold, and 
an unconditional transfer payment that is unrelated to income. Indeed, the refundable 
tax credit could be administered, without any change in net incomes, by an entirely 
separate agency and could be given a name (such as a ‘basic income’, or ‘grant’) that 
is unrelated to income taxation. In contrast, it would not be possible to separate the 
non-refundable tax credit from the income tax system. 
 









       
 (B4) 
as conventionally obtained.  
 
If interest is in using the revenue elasticity at a given income level as an indication of 
overall progressivity of taxes and transfers, then the refundable tax credit clearly 
increases progressivity of the tax and transfer system as a whole. Perhaps it is then 
desirable to include both components.
16 But if concern is with the effect on tax 
revenue of inflation – fiscal drag – then it can be argued that allowance should be 
made only for non-refundable tax credits, and not refundable credits which, as 
suggested above, can be entirely separated from the income tax system, both 
conceptually and administratively. 
                                                 
16 However, measures of progressivity based on the Gini measure, such as Kakwani’s measure of 
disproportionality, could not be produced because the Gini is not defined for negative values 46 
 
Appendix C.  
 
 
Table 17  Separate values of G for Central and Regional Governments 
Central Government Tax Schedule 
    1 Ga     2 Ga     3 Ga     4 Ga  
National  0.290193 0.305909 0.132724 0.161007 
Andalucía  0.330057 0.326354 0.123810 0.116320 
Aragón  0.325034 0.333407 0.123724 0.113364 
Asturias  0.314239 0.347408 0.125436 0.108673 
Baleares  0.320947 0.275424 0.132188 0.164704 
Canarias  0.298323 0.304869 0.143412 0.142245 
Cantabria  0.327856 0.318916 0.125361 0.123590 
Castilla-León  0.340052 0.338948 0.127512 0.091601 
Castilla-La  Mancha  0.383015 0.318322 0.114543 0.088942 
Cataluña  0.259386 0.303344 0.136780 0.184428 
Valencia  0.345647 0.303937 0.119325 0.129922 
Extremadura  0.390029 0.319601 0.112433 0.083703 
Galicia  0.346616 0.312747 0.125405 0.113442 
Madrid  0.197128 0.275025 0.149916 0.254015 
Murcia  0.343290 0.316890 0.126424 0.111306 
Rioja  0.363215 0.306374 0.127387 0.103131 
 
Regional Government Tax Schedule 
    1 Ga     2 Ga     3 Ga     4 Ga  
National  0.290193 0.305909 0.132695 0.153661 
Andalucía  0.330057 0.326354 0.123782 0.110587 
Aragón  0.325034 0.333407 0.123696 0.107555 
Asturias  0.314239 0.347408 0.125408 0.103328 
Baleares  0.320947 0.275424 0.132159 0.157417 
Canarias  0.298323 0.304869 0.143380 0.135400 
Cantabria  0.327856 0.318916 0.125333 0.117504 
Castilla-León  0.340052 0.338948 0.127483 0.086780 
Castilla-La  Mancha  0.383015 0.318322 0.114517 0.084169 
Cataluña  0.259386 0.303344 0.136749 0.175948 
Valencia  0.345647 0.303937 0.119298 0.123599 
Extremadura  0.390029 0.319601 0.112407 0.078957 
Galicia  0.346616 0.312747 0.125377 0.107694 
Madrid  0.197128 0.271630 0.147188 0.241403 
Murcia  0.343290 0.316890 0.126396 0.105809 




Appendix D. Detailed Tables 
 
This appendix reports summary information regarding the calculation of individual 
and aggregate elasticities reported above.  
 
 
First, Tables 18 to 22 show ancillary elasticities estimated for a range of types of tax 
unit .  
 
Tables 23 and 24 then examine the relevance of allowance transfers from income 
source 1 to source 2. The first column reports the total number of tax units within the 
quintile in the region that enjoy the transfer whereas the second column exhibits the 
percentage of total allowance transfer within the region that is absorbed by the 
quintile of  1 y . As shown, this allowance transfer seems to be quite regionally 
symmetric, as nearly for every region around 10 per cent of the taxpayers within the 
first quantile of  1 y enjoy the transfer of allowances and around 98 per cent of the total 
transferred allowance is enjoyed by tax units in the first quintile. This fact suggests 
that in computing the ancillary elasticity 
2 h Ay  attention must be focused on the 
distribution of  1 y  and not of the total gross income  h y . 
 




Table 18  Ancillary Elasticities 
1.ANDALUCIA 
h y y1   
h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2    h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.8205  0.2058  1.3595  4.5981 27.3225  2.0410 2.0116 
q1_s2 2.4653  0.3790  2.4337  4.3717 3.4366 3.2165 3.1698 
q1_s3 2.1075  0.0000  1.7938  2.7451 3.3026 3.4651 3.4229 
q2_s1 1.1769  7.1982  0.5454  128.3250 87.9449  0.6522  0.6493 
q2_s2 1.1115  -2.1130  1.7965  102.4565 3.7185  1.0644  1.1029 
q2_s3 1.0486  5.7543  0.7493  129.1173 3.3098  1.9123  1.8804 
q3_s1 0.7120  9.9772  0.0000  59.1907 19.3692 0.3040  0.2826 
q3_s2 1.1111  4.9313  1.1714  37.8552 2.5185  0.3718  0.3846 
q3_s3 1.0256  7.4778  0.8834  55.6681 1.8466  0.8578  0.8611 
q4_s1 0.9262  5.8885  1.3786  31.0950 18.3945 0.2010  0.1935 
q4_s2 0.8996  0.0000  0.9749  14.1905 2.0204  0.1908  0.1718 
q4_s3 0.9767  0.0000  0.0000  25.7131 1.3256  0.1989  0.1920 
q5_s1 0.6873  2.1406  -0.3787  -4.3432 -1.6393 0.0514  0.0444 
q5_s2 0.7398  2.9049  0.0000  0.0000 1.3373 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3 0.9277  3.1408  0.2336  -3.3722 1.5950  0.0799  0.0762 
2.ARAGÓN 
h y y1   
h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2    h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.4250  0.5685  0.8685  3.9588 12.4536  1.9495 1.9208 
q1_s2 1.8843  0.6728  1.4421  5.0059 2.8221 2.8060 2.7626 
q1_s3 1.7934  0.4116  1.2803  3.0965 2.8225 2.8991 2.8628 
q2_s1 1.4505  0.0000  1.1728  47.3184 33.2372 0.4147  0.4751 
q2_s2 1.2646  -1.8892  0.9436  32.7148 2.6282  1.4606  1.4190 
q2_s3 1.0805  0.0000  0.0000  32.1120 5.5508  1.1781  1.1590 
q3_s1 0.5632  3.8990  -0.7661  38.4092 14.9674 0.2910  0.2683 
q3_s2 1.0306  0.0000  0.0000  38.9248 1.9822  0.3199  0.3874 
q3_s3 1.0834  2.8321  0.0000  24.6546 3.1928  0.6635  0.6756 
q4_s1 1.0271  0.0000  0.6986  19.7880 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s2 1.0262  0.0000  0.6376  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3 1.0013  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1 0.7619  2.0768  0.2393  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0601 
q5_s2 0.9181  1.8416  0.4902  0.0000 1.8270 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3 0.8714  1.8909  0.2026  0.0000 1.8559 0.0461 0.0451 
3.ASTURIAS 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.7063  0.3353  1.3490  3.5916 14.7046  1.8832 1.8549 
q1_s2 2.0593  0.4367  1.8835  5.5782 2.9393 3.1504 3.1024 
q1_s3 1.9677  0.0000  2.1454  3.0272 2.2235 2.9185 2.8831 
q2_s1 1.3195  0.0000  1.3192  76.5031 51.2197 0.7538  0.7649 
q2_s2 0.9585  0.0000  1.2793  59.5610 3.6513  2.0431  2.0477 
q2_s3 1.1520  8.4528  -1.0714  0.0000 1.5852 2.1234 2.1103 
q3_s1 1.0272  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 15.0482  0.4849 0.4559 
q3_s2 0.8664  0.0000  0.0000  47.2858 2.1763  0.6929  0.6721 
q3_s3 0.8937  0.0000  0.0000  85.9305 2.2531  0.4859  0.5005 
q4_s1 1.0210  10.8294  0.0000  34.1867 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s2 0.9503  8.0631  0.0000  38.2689 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s3 1.0159  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1 0.7110  3.7579  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s2 0.8777  1.6330  0.0000  0.0000 1.0350 -0.0717  -0.0733 
q5_s3 0.9737  2.6641  0.0000  0.0000 1.0127 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 19  Ancillary Elasticities (Continued) 
4.BALEARES 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.5501  0.2360  0.8848  6.3064 28.3043  1.9475 1.9192 
q1_s2 2.2556  0.3038  1.5877  6.8316 5.6941 2.8488 2.7982 
q1_s3 1.7156  0.0000  1.1882  0.0000 3.1893 2.8929 2.8557 
q2_s1 0.8698  0.0000  0.4517  138.9513 68.2686  0.5463  0.5543 
q2_s2 1.2602  0.0000  0.7924  84.6014 8.4081  1.4202  1.4313 
q2_s3 0.9036  0.0000  0.0000  129.4957 10.5477  1.1634  1.1501 
q3_s1 1.0517  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 26.5219  0.5627 0.5286 
q3_s2 0.9889  3.6977  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q3_s3 0.9223  6.9295  0.0000  60.5937 0.0000  0.5288  0.5251 
q4_s1 1.4391  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2 1.2056  0.0000  0.0000  28.8982 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s3 0.9633  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1 0.6188  1.9306  0.0000  -7.6470 -2.2827 -0.1194 -0.1141 
q5_s2 0.9829  1.5435  0.3900  0.0000 1.0245 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3 0.8599  1.7982  0.2007  -2.7518 1.8752  0.0409  0.0403 
5.CANARIAS 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.3350  0.0000  1.1848  2.4709 20.8826  2.2713 2.2398 
q1_s2 1.8006  0.0000  2.0868  3.3040 2.5293 3.2092 3.1628 
q1_s3 1.4746  0.0000  1.2656  2.5069 2.4717 2.8763 2.8407 
q2_s1 1.0215  11.8792  0.7669  133.9884 42.3304  0.3762  0.3697 
q2_s2 1.1385  4.1228  1.4386  80.1577 1.9472  1.2301  1.2621 
q2_s3 1.0029  10.4332  0.4987  113.8376 3.3765  1.6138  1.5915 
q3_s1 0.7362  7.7179  0.0000  50.2407 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q3_s2 0.6380  9.2348  1.5675  31.9513 1.6762  0.2719  0.2516 
q3_s3 0.9330  7.1229  1.6649  42.7605 0.0000  0.6032  0.5976 
q4_s1 0.9548  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2 1.1288  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 1.5947 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3 1.0401  4.1661  0.0000  28.4397 1.6333  0.0000  0.0000 
q5_s1 0.6581  2.7895  0.0000  -6.9937 0.0000  0.3120  0.3040 
q5_s2 0.8242  3.1597  0.2611  0.0000 0.7369 0.2615 0.2532 
q5_s3 0.9688  3.3904  0.3346  -2.5319 1.3082  0.2918  0.2879 
6.CANTABRIA 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.9938  0.4285  0.9121  2.1654 18.9311  1.9805 1.9485 
q1_s2 2.5854  0.5642  1.4734  5.1249 3.1040 2.4378 2.4003 
q1_s3 2.7109  0.0000  1.3822  1.6888 2.6639 3.2045 3.1640 
q2_s1 1.5120  2.7318  1.4593  63.5130 49.6894 0.6749  0.7105 
q2_s2 1.6249  0.0000  1.8295  53.8142 4.5355  1.8991  1.8483 
q2_s3 1.1322  3.6478  0.0000  64.7111 6.9505  1.7383  1.7117 
q3_s1 1.4992  0.0000  0.0000  30.0837 20.9058 0.0000  0.0000 
q3_s2 0.7369  0.0000  0.0000  43.7776 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q3_s3 0.0000  5.3591  0.0000  51.3651 1.5421  0.7441  0.7404 
q4_s1 1.0063  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3 0.9628  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 3.0079 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1 0.9117  1.2343  0.8185  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s2 0.9941  2.4223  0.3900  0.0000 1.0926 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3 1.0225  2.2780  0.0000  0.0000 1.4441 0.1175 0.1134 
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Table 20  Ancillary Elasticities (Continued.) 
7.CASTILLA.
-LEÓN   h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 2.0242  0.6203  1.2294  3.6613 28.9743  1.8425 2.1527 
q1_s2 2.8639  0.6498  2.3222  4.3653 4.9284 2.7991 3.5656 
q1_s3 2.4881  0.4375  2.0019  3.7181 3.9891 2.7058 3.4365 
q2_s1 1.3332  -1.0370  1.1798  44.3580 62.2967 0.5313  0.6043 
q2_s2 0.9414  -3.1346  1.1729  29.2927 4.0597  1.3595  1.4475 
q2_s3 0.8350  0.0000  1.1134  37.3354 6.1049  1.4951  1.5473 
q3_s1 0.8839  3.3659  0.6456  26.6663 14.6671 0.3499  0.3304 
q3_s2 1.1416  2.6431  0.0000  26.8162 2.3996  0.3543  0.3827 
q3_s3 0.7732  3.8607  0.7678  49.4595 3.5170  0.6750  0.6881 
q4_s1 0.9590  2.4449  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2 0.9923  0.0000  0.8889  18.1597 1.9230  0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s3 1.0194  2.8897  0.0000  15.0051 2.0646  0.0000  0.0000 
q5_s1 0.8441  1.8957  0.3332  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s2 0.7643  1.8933  0.4139  2.3468 2.5508 -0.0437  -0.0515 
q5_s3 0.9742  1.8554  0.5500  2.3777 2.8466 0.0721 0.0646 
8.CASTILLA-
LA MANCHA  h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.8479  0.4980  1.1269  3.9525 12.2662  1.9043 1.8786 
q1_s2 2.1594  0.6174  1.7816  5.1921 1.6619 3.6114 3.5554 
q1_s3 2.2881  0.2801  1.7177  1.7446 1.9827 3.6069 3.5632 
q2_s1 1.2166  5.9103  1.0560  78.0549 39.5604 0.6283  0.6509 
q2_s2 1.3730  -3.8874  1.4940  58.2568 1.5127  1.2970  1.3161 
q2_s3 0.9865  2.9457  0.5633  66.0249 2.8651  1.5656  1.5430 
q3_s1 0.8097  0.0000  0.9213  37.1462 8.3192  0.2819  0.2537 
q3_s2 0.9003  3.7643  1.0943  30.0386 0.0000  0.2463  0.3010 
q3_s3 0.9475  5.7290  0.0000  27.1166 0.0000  0.7308  0.7263 
q4_s1 1.0243  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 8.8109 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2 0.9769  4.5993  0.0000  0.0000 0.0000 0.1906 0.1870 
q4_s3 0.8302  3.5042  0.0000  0.0000 1.2409 0.1043 0.1031 
q5_s1 0.8559  2.7507  0.6308  0.0000 1.5616 0.1550 0.1463 
q5_s2 0.6728  1.7477  0.3617  0.0000 1.4584 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3 0.9516  2.4500  0.3482  1.6601 1.7194 0.0453 0.0480 
9.CATALUÑ
A  h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1 1.8801  0.3372  1.3023  5.2325 36.5498  2.1046 2.5151 
q1_s2 2.4396  0.5427  2.1184  5.1343 5.4327 2.6641 3.3848 
q1_s3 2.0844  0.2930  1.7918  4.8056 4.7565 3.3997 4.3632 
q2_s1 1.2691  0.0000  0.7463  93.2560 84.8643 0.6192  0.6302 
q2_s2 1.1340  0.0000  0.7777  75.1066 6.6710  1.2067  1.3594 
q2_s3 1.2194  1.7079  0.8174  74.8974 10.6875 1.2028  1.2486 
q3_s1 1.0628  0.0000  0.7171  40.5051 18.1412 0.4119  0.3768 
q3_s2 1.5956  2.5038  0.5831  35.7114 -2.2788  0.3287  0.3462 
q3_s3 0.8440  0.0000  0.0000  40.6745 3.9973  0.5346  0.5385 
q4_s1 0.6446  0.0000  1.1294  24.9068 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s2 0.8955  1.6495  0.9527  25.2876 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s3 1.1859  0.0000  1.2033  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1 0.7671  1.5166  0.1348  -4.3291 -1.2435 0.0000  0.0000 
q5_s2 0.9682  1.3211  0.2996  -3.0253 1.3964  0.0000  0.0000 
q5_s3 0.9387  1.4722  0.1951  -6.5189 1.1371  0.1066  0.1035 
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Table 21  Ancillary Elasticities (Continued) 
10. C.VALENCIANA 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1  1.6081  0.3398 0.9860 6.7619 26.7854  2.1633 2.1305 
q1_s2  2.1051  0.4564 2.0451 5.6606 3.2977 3.1345 3.0837 
q1_s3  1.8299  0.0000 1.5441 6.7808 3.3960 2.8988 2.8634 
q2_s1  1.2415  0.0000 0.6937 100.8261 87.4532  0.4239  0.4558 
q2_s2  1.1155  0.0000 0.7722 85.2117  4.1657 1.3290 1.3561 
q2_s3  1.0600  0.0000 0.0000 114.9881  5.3258 1.8076 1.7702 
q3_s1  0.9468  8.2590 0.0000 28.9398 16.6372 0.2933  0.2741 
q3_s2  0.6716  5.6793 0.0000 37.0663  3.1720 0.2776 0.2495 
q3_s3  0.9361  0.0000 0.0000 56.8774  2.0000 0.6566 0.6684 
q4_s1  1.2862  0.0000 0.0000 27.3681 18.2219 0.0000  0.0000 
q4_s2  0.9905  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 2.8309 -0.1706  0.0000 
q4_s3  0.8963  4.4397 0.0000 17.1309  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1  0.7139  2.4676 0.0000 -3.3929 -1.7737 0.0000  0.0000 
q5_s2  0.7814  2.1786 0.0000 -1.5149  0.7139 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3  0.8982  2.3211 0.0000 -2.5843  1.6074 0.0733 0.0700 
11.EXTREMADURA 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1  1.4454  0.3390 0.7411 5.0005 13.1230  1.8823 1.8561 
q1_s2  1.6215  0.5181 0.9240 5.0525 1.8199 4.0801 4.0165 
q1_s3  1.6483  0.3549 0.9142 3.2053 2.2451 3.8361 3.7859 
q2_s1  1.0989  0.0000 1.0289 84.9568 47.7531 0.3849  0.4066 
q2_s2  0.9708  0.0000 0.8909 68.8747  1.4870 1.3216 1.3499 
q2_s3  1.0784  0.0000 0.5995 88.8294  2.1742 1.8956 1.8590 
q3_s1  1.3294  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 20.7554  0.4418 0.4166 
q3_s2  0.9508  0.0000 0.0000 40.1981  1.3586 0.4595 0.4900 
q3_s3  1.0379  0.0000 0.0000 42.0373  0.0000 0.7770 0.7942 
q4_s1  1.0298  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2  0.6486  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3  1.0333  0.0000 0.0000 27.0921  2.3585 0.2542 0.2442 
q5_s1  0.7147  3.1426 0.0000 0.0000 3.5106 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s2  0.6916  1.9755 0.2927 0.0000 1.0546 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3  0.9408  1.9524 0.2207 0.0000 1.8815 0.0461 0.0440 
12.GALICIA  
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1  1.8915  0.3832 1.4723 2.4911 25.7811  1.9746 1.9447 
q1_s2  2.2954  0.5274 2.4546 4.9655 3.4036 2.8354 2.7887 
q1_s3  2.1737  0.3427 2.7202 3.0592 3.0711 2.8585 2.8228 
q2_s1  1.4955  2.2678 0.8776 84.6358 78.9203 0.3947  0.4150 
q2_s2 1.4210  -1.4378  0.9010  63.5349  5.5315 1.2477 1.3085 
q2_s3  1.1512  3.3239 0.0000 93.0862  6.6263 1.5838 1.5570 
q3_s1  1.0331  0.0000 0.0000 20.4439 27.7931 0.2989  0.2753 
q3_s2  0.8813  0.0000 0.0000 26.5955  4.6097 0.5034 0.5223 
q3_s3  1.0031  2.0815 1.1116 29.3046  2.2865 0.6458 0.6504 
q4_s1  1.2405  4.7003 1.3134 0.0000 14.8608  0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2  1.0478  0.0000 0.0000 26.2959  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3  0.9678  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1471 0.1465 
q5_s1  0.6199  2.5121 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s2  0.7226  1.9098 0.0000 0.0000 1.0492 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3  0.9091  2.3956 0.0000 0.0000 1.5111 0.0790 0.0771 
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Table 22  Ancillary Elasticities (Continued) 
13. MADRID 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1  1.7376  0.0000 1.1176 5.8808 27.8641  2.0558 2.0289 
q1_s2  2.5448  0.0000 2.2251 3.8212 4.1030 2.4541 2.4164 
q1_s3 2.0223  -0.4228  1.6699  4.1805 3.4917 2.4758 2.4464 
q2_s1 1.0451  14.3179  0.3857  125.6319 100.8233 0.6182  0.6380 
q2_s2  1.0806  0.0000 0.6029 71.0491  5.1413 1.6720 1.6147 
q2_s3 1.1965  12.7355  0.7417  100.3224  8.7103 1.5100 1.4975 
q3_s1 1.0674  21.7006  0.0000  57.6473  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q3_s2  1.1147  0.0000 0.0000 67.5781  0.0000 0.3889 0.3978 
q3_s3 1.0286  17.0318  0.0000  71.4179  9.3086 0.6513 0.6314 
q4_s1  0.8175  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 28.7706  0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2  0.9013  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3  1.0371  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 5.8871 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1  1.0707  2.3522 0.5616 -2.5481  0.6368 0.0232 0.0000 
q5_s2  0.9531  1.6480 0.2210 -1.4988 1.1803  -0.0217 -0.0237 
q5_s3  1.0746  2.4575 0.0941 -3.0772  1.4306 0.1167 0.1123 
14.  
MURCIA  h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1  1.2846  0.2726 0.7871 5.4376 21.3876  2.1069 2.0783 
q1_s2  1.6568  0.5604 1.4539 6.4650 2.6695 3.6203 3.5734 
q1_s3  1.4503  0.2013 0.9833 4.1555 2.6057 3.2809 3.2422 
q2_s1  1.1156  5.7032 0.0000 131.3364 41.8318  1.1995  1.1719 
q2_s2  0.9684  0.0000 0.4542 103.9960  2.9609 1.9270 1.9741 
q2_s3  1.0671  5.6682 0.7225 150.6989  3.3626 1.9864 1.9590 
q3_s1  0.9972  0.0000 0.0000 72.4662 16.7221 0.0000  0.0000 
q3_s2  0.8422  5.6851 0.0000 50.1372  0.0000 0.5469 0.5347 
q3_s3  0.9439  9.0476 0.0000 53.4844  0.0000 0.6699 0.6719 
q4_s1  1.0394  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.5200  -0.5079 
q4_s2  0.7584  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3  1.1301  0.0000 1.1018 0.0000 0.0000 0.2754 0.2631 
q5_s1  0.9410  2.4641 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s2  0.6966  3.1325 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3  0.8923  2.1635 0.4289 0.0000 1.4163 0.0958 0.0941 
15.-RIOJA 
h y y1    h y y2   
h y E1    h y E2   
h y A1   
h Ccy   
h Cry   
q1_s1  1.4331  0.5671 1.6222 2.5662 8.4924 2.0262 1.9905 
q1_s2  1.8920  0.8156 2.8636 5.9033 2.6889 3.5610 3.5082 
q1_s3  1.6264  0.3666 1.5478 0.0000 2.3944 3.5131 3.4652 
q2_s1  1.5141  0.0000 0.9115 45.8763 29.7247 0.4323  0.4426 
q2_s2  1.4904  0.0000 0.0000 23.9619  2.6452 1.3608 1.3231 
q2_s3  0.7462  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 4.5320 0.9685 0.9226 
q3_s1  1.0765  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 10.9141  0.0000 0.2662 
q3_s2  0.9849  0.0000 0.0000 33.5031  0.0000 0.4056 0.4270 
q3_s3  0.9967  5.1696 0.0000 30.6389  2.6807 0.4962 0.5029 
q4_s1  1.2425  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s2  0.9285  3.6108 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q4_s3  0.9203  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s1  0.6524  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s2  0.7959  1.5261 0.0000 3.3390 1.2002 0.0000 0.0000 
q5_s3  0.8772  2.2746 0.0000 0.0000 1.9354 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 23   Ancillary Elasticities (Continued)  
        
 1.  ANDALUCIA  2.ARAGÓN 3.ASTURIAS  4.BALEARES 
 
h y A2   
h y A2   
h y A2   
h y A2   
q1y1_s1 -2.3045  -2.3926  -1.8299  -1.6309 
q1y1_s2 -1.2318  -1.0804  -1.0348  -1.3616 
q1y1_s3 -1.2811  -1.4364  -1.1986  -1.1720 
q2y1 27.8889  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q3y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q5y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
        
 5.  CANARIAS  6.CANTABRIA  7.CASTILLA-LEÓN 8.CASTILLA-LAMANCHA 
 
h y A2   
h y A2   
h y A2   
h y A2   
q1y1_s1 -2.4492  -2.9433  -3.0592  -3.1073 
q1y1_s2 -1.5713  -1.2506  -1.5991  -1.7577 
q1y1_s3 -1.1071  -1.3995  -1.4823  -1.4018 
q2y1 0.0000  0.0000  11.7329  0.0000 
q3y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q5y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
        
  9.CATALUÑA  10. C. VALENCIANA 11.EXTREMADURA  12.GALICIA 
 
h y A2   
h y A2   
h y A2   
h y A2   
q1y1_s1 -1.7060  -1.5217  0.0000  -2.9982 
q1y1_s2 -1.2424  -1.3263  -1.8460  -2.2999 
q1y1_s3 -1.4376  -1.1180  -1.7441  -2.0975 
q2y1 19.5174  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q3y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q5y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
        
 13.MADRID 14.MURCIA  15.RIOJA 
 
h y A2   
h y A2   
h y A2   
q1y1_s1 -0.8009  -1.8647  -3.0001 
q1y1_s2 -0.7080  -1.4009  -1.2561 
q1y1_s3 -0.6662  -1.3354  -2.0290 
q2y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q3y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q4y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
q5y1 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 





Table 24  Relevance of Allowance Transfer from Income Source 1 to Source 2: By 
Quintiles of Income Source 1 




2.ARAGÓN  % Tax Unit 




q1_y1 0.101  0.98  q1_y1  0.096  0.97 
q2_y1 0.004  0.02  q2_y1  0.006  0.03 
q3_y1 0.000  0.00  q3_y1  0.001  0.00 




% Tax Unit 







% Tax Unit 





q1_y1 0.104  0.94  q1_y1  0.093  0.97 
q2_y1 0.010  0.05  q2_y1  0.003  0.02 
q3_y1 0.002  0.01  q3_y1  0.000  0.00 




% Tax Unit 







% Tax Unit 





q1_y1 0.063  0.98  q1_y1  0.088  0.97 
q2_y1 0.001  0.02  q2_y1  0.007  0.02 
q3_y1 0.000  0.00  q3_y1  0.000  0.00 





% Tax Unit 














q1_y1 0.094  0.97  q1_y1  0.112  0.98 
q2_y1 0.006  0.03  q2_y1  0.004  0.02 
q3_y1 0.001  0.00  q3_y1  0.000  0.00 
q4_y1 0.000  0.00  q4_y1  0.000  0.00 





Table 25  Relevance of Allowance Transfer from Income Source 1 to Source 2: By 
Quintiles of Income Source 1 (Continued). 
9.CATALUÑA  % Tax Unit 
 with A2>0 
% over 
total A2 
10.VALENCIA  % Tax Unit 




q1_y1 0.090  0.97  q1_y1  0.081  0.97 
q2_y1 0.005  0.02  q2_y1  0.005  0.03 
q3_y1 0.001  0.00  q3_y1  0.000  0.00 




% Tax Unit 







% Tax Unit 





q1_y1 0.113  0.98  q1_y1  0.086  0.97 
q2_y1 0.003  0.02  q2_y1  0.005  0.02 
q3_y1 0.000  0.00  q3_y1  0.001  0.00 




% Tax Unit 







% Tax Unit 





q1_y1 0.090  0.97  q1_y1  0.107  0.95 
q2_y1 0.004  0.02  q2_y1  0.007  0.05 
q3_y1 0.000  0.00  q3_y1  0.000  0.00 









q5_y1 0.000  0.00 
q1_y1 0.116  0.98       
q2_y1 0.005  0.02       
q3_y1 0.000  0.00       
q4_y1 0.000  0.00       
q5_y1 0.000  0.00 
 
 
 Table 26  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 
each Autonomous Community 
WHOLE COUNTRY        1.ANDALUCIA          
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2938 0.0771  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2818 0.0712  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1527 0.0646  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1424 0.0731  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2871 0.0712  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2775 0.0656  0.43 
h ATR   0.1235 0.0923  0.43 
h ATR   0.1040 0.0878  0.43 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1503 0.1012  0.43  * _ h ATR TI   0.1277 0.0979  0.43 
1 hh y y   0.9259 0.1902  1 
1 hh y y   0.9374 0.1841  1 
2 hh y y   0.0716 0.1846  1 
2 hh y y   0.0587 0.1744  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2588 0.1665  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2720 0.1776  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0038 0.0262  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0021 0.0221  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0604 0.1084  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0783 0.1228  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0087 0.0858  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0095 0.0898  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0615 0.0302  0.2612 
Ch h Cy   0.0640 0.0303  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0325 0.0161  0.1293 
Rh h Cy   0.0339 0.0162  0.0834 
2.ARAGÓN           3.ASTURIAS          
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2862 0.0721  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2853 0.0712  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1658 0.0485  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1544 0.0629  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2788 0.0657  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2803 0.0650  0.43 
h ATR   0.1161 0.0820  0.42 
h ATR   0.1136 0.0835  0.42 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1443 0.0922  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1427 0.0935  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9048 0.2055  1 
1 hh y y   0.9236 0.1982  1 
2 hh y y   0.0941 0.2034  1 
2 hh y y   0.0736 0.1921  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2519 0.1627  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2668 0.1812  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0066 0.0323  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0041 0.0252  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0540 0.0992  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0593 0.1044  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0114 0.0980  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0115 0.0988  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0613 0.0300  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0598 0.0311  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0324 0.0160  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0318 0.0167  0.0834 













Table 27  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 




   5.CANARIAS 
 
  
 Mean  Std_Dev  Max   Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2935 0.0776 0.43 
1 kh t   0.2924 0.0746  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1618 0.0543 0.18 
2 kh t   0.1171 0.0858  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2870 0.0715 0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2886 0.0689  0.43 
h ATR   0.1269 0.0936 0.42 
h ATR   0.1188 0.0866  0.42 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1532 0.1019 0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1449 0.0960  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9323 0.1798  1 
1 hh y y   0.9575 0.1540  1 
2 hh y y   0.0648 0.1728  1 
2 hh y y   0.0396 0.1452  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2574 0.1589  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2674 0.1665  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0027 0.0180  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0020 0.0202  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0435 0.0907  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0591 0.1044  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0077 0.0827  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0045 0.0622  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0628 0.0300  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0619 0.0293  0.2612 
Rh h Cy   0.0332 0.0160  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0328 0.0156  0.1286 
CANTABRIA 
 
    7. CASTILLA Y LEÓN     
 Mean  Std_Dev  Max   Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2938 0.0771 0.43 
1 kh t   0.2808 0.0688  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1527 0.0646 0.18 
2 kh t   0.1621 0.0539  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2871 0.0712 0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2751 0.0634  0.43 
h ATR   0.1235 0.0923 0.43 
h ATR   0.1062 0.0811  0.42 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1503 0.1012 0.43  * _ h ATR TI   0.1328 0.0921  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9259 0.1902  1 
1 hh y y   0.9029 0.2126  1 
2 hh y y   0.0716 0.1846  1 
2 hh y y   0.0951 0.2087  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2588 0.1665  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2507 0.1702  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0038 0.0262  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0056 0.0299  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0604 0.1084  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0673 0.1167  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0087 0.0858  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0121 0.1018  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0615 0.0302  0.2612 
Ch h Cy   0.0638 0.0311  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0325 0.0161  0.1293 
Rh h Cy   0.0337 0.0167  0.0834 






Table 28  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 




     9.CATALUÑA 
  
    
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2754 0.0668  0.43 
1 kh t   0.3021 0.0798  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1571 0.0600  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1633 0.0522  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2708 0.0614  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2939 0.0736  0.43 
h ATR   0.0943 0.0820  0.41 
h ATR   0.1361 0.0917  0.43 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1179 0.0935  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1650 0.0998  0.43 
1 hh y y   0.9252 0.1901  1 
1 hh y y   0.9183 0.1937  1 
2 hh y y   0.0728 0.1857  1 
2 hh y y   0.0802 0.1905  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2638 0.1692  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2453 0.1543  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0036 0.0289  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0046 0.0289  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0899 0.1381  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0437 0.0872  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0120 0.1009  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0079 0.0821  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0650 0.0302  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0594 0.0298  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0343 0.0162  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0313 0.0159  0.0834 
10.COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA 
  
   11. EXTREMADURA      
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2848 0.0730  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2729 0.0650  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1502 0.0669  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1571 0.0600  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2779 0.0673  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2687 0.0613  0.43 
h ATR   0.1116 0.0883  0.42 
h ATR   0.0907 0.0821  0.40 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1370 0.0977  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1125 0.0938  0.41 
1 hh y y   0.9254 0.1860  1 
1 hh y y   0.9321 0.1820  1 
2 hh y y   0.0723 0.1805  1 
2 hh y y   0.0657 0.1765  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2739 0.1669  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2786 0.1801  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0035 0.0251  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0020 0.0178  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0583 0.1055  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0951 0.1435  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0073 0.0782  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0108 0.0952  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0631 0.0292  0.1938 
Ch h Cy   0.0645 0.0305  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0334 0.0156  0.1090 
Rh h Cy   0.0342 0.0164  0.0834 





Table 29  Basic Statistics for Key Tax Variables for Whole Country and for 
each Autonomous Community (Continued) 
12.GALICIA 
  
      13.MADRID 
  
     
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2831 0.0715  0.43 
1 kh t   0.3167 0.0836  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1474 0.0693  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1508 0.0663  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2772 0.0658  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.3078 0.0784  0.43 
h ATR   0.1085 0.0864  0.42 
h ATR   0.1558 0.0996  0.43 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1342 0.0968  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1849 0.1054  0.43 
1 hh y y   0.9268 0.1911  1 
1 hh y y   0.9300 0.1852  1 
2 hh y y   0.0695 0.1827  1 
2 hh y y   0.0680 0.1803  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2693 0.1763  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2388 0.1508  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0033 0.0269  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0042 0.0258  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0676 0.1243  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0465 0.0880  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0089 0.0860  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0063 0.0738  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0637 0.0317  0.2248 
Ch h Cy   0.0564 0.0294  0.1612 
Rh h Cy   0.0338 0.0170  0.1293 
Rh h Cy   0.0297 0.0156  0.0834 
14.MURCIA 
  
      15.RIOJA 
  
     
   Mean  Std_Dev  Max     Mean  Std_Dev  Max 
1 kh t   0.2805 0.0712  0.43 
1 kh t   0.2827 0.0714  0.43 
2 kh t   0.1463 0.0703  0.18 
2 kh t   0.1653 0.0493  0.18 
(weighted) kh t   0.2758 0.0652  0.43 
(weighted) kh t   0.2748 0.0647  0.43 
h ATR   0.1000 0.0866  0.41 
h ATR   0.1117 0.0818  0.39 
* _ h ATR TI   0.1234 0.0970  0.42  * _ h ATR TI   0.1377 0.0913  0.42 
1 hh y y   0.9358 0.1819  1 
1 hh y y   0.8966 0.2168  1 
2 hh y y   0.0615 0.1754  1 
2 hh y y   0.1020 0.2143  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2828 0.1795  1 
1 hh Ey   0.2474 0.1674  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0025 0.0225  1 
2 hh Ey   0.0064 0.0316  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0680 0.1125  1 
1 hh Ay   0.0545 0.1031  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0098 0.0900  1 
2 hh Ay   0.0126 0.1023  1 
Ch h Cy   0.0647 0.0295  0.1566 
Ch h Cy   0.0629 0.0302  0.1566 
Rh h Cy   0.0343 0.0158  0.0834 
Rh h Cy   0.0332 0.0161  0.0834 
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